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UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF PAPERS
Eric Schnapper*
U NTIL a decade ago,' the Supreme Court consistently held
that documents enjoyed special protection under the fourth
amendment. For example, more than a dozen decisions over the
course of a century3 reiterated that an individual's private-papers
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in Law,
Columbia University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. Phil. 1965, Ox-
ford University; L.L.B. 1968, Yale University.
1 See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974). The change in the law from the
1920's to the 1960's is described in Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers:
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 274, 275-88 (1973).
Even more recently, the Court appeared to recognize a constitutional right to keep
"purely private papers" confidential in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
459 (1977). Justice White suggested that the government may not constitutionally seize the
"purely private letters or diaries" of a former president. Id. at 488 (White, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger argued that "truly private papers or communications, such as a per-
sonal diary or family correspondence ... lie at the core of First and Fourth Amendment
interests." Id. at 529 n.27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
330 (1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886)); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 n.17 (1947); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-88 (1946); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
205 n.33 (1946) (citing Boyd); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932); Oln-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458-60 (1928) (citing Boyd), overruled in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1976); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1921);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397 (1914); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478,
489 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-78, 380-81 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201
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were absolutely exempt from seizure, regardless of the existence of
an otherwise valid warrant. Throughout this period, the Court also
invalidated on fourth and fifth amendment grounds the use of
compulsory process to obtain private papers from a defendant for
introduction in a criminal proceeding.4 Noting that the historical
limitations on searches and seizures in England arose out of con-
flicts between the government and the press,5 the Court further
insisted that any search warrant or subpoena for documents that
affects free speech be scrutinized with particular care., Many of
the Court's decisions were based on its 1886 opinion in Boyd v.
United States, which Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter praised
as "a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in
the United States."8
In the last ten years, however, the Burger Court has repeatedly
questioned these longstanding principles. The Court has derided
the protection accorded to private papers as "a rule searching for a
rationale." In 1976, the Court apparently discarded the broad rule
against the compulsory production of incriminating documents, as-
U.S. 43, 71 (1906) (citing Boyd); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 45-46
(1904) (citing Boyd); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-35 (1886). But see Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1981) (noting that the fourth amendment "protects people
and their effects, and it protects those effects whether they are "personal" or "impersonal."
...Once placed within... a container, a diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the
Fourth Amendment").
" See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
327, 330 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
1 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972); Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469-70 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6 See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1973) (fourth amendment standards to
be applied with "scrupulous exactitude") (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485
(1965)); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) (fourth amend-
ment protection particularly necessary for unorthodox political views); Lee Art Theatre, Inc.
v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per curiam) (search warrant lacked "necessary sensitiv-
ity to freedom of expression"); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 n.16 (1965) (fourth
amendment standards to be applied with "scrupulous exactitude").
S116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
455 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting)); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 606-07 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(citing Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
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serting that it was based on "discredited" precedents.10 Moreover,
the Court has in recent years often upheld search warrants and
subpoenas used to obtain documents from the press, a practice vir-
tually unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence since the reign of
George III."' Boyd, once lauded as a landmark in the protection of
civil liberties, has been dismissed as wrongly decided.'2
The Supreme Court nevertheless has stopped short of com-
pletely disavowing the century of precedents granting special
fourth amendment protection to papers. The Court has expressly
reserved the question of whether some papers, such as diaries,' 3
are immune from seizure.' 4 Moreover, the Court continues to give
at least lip service to the principle that "scrupulous exactitude" is
required in deciding if the fourth amendment permits compulsory
production of speech-related documents.15
The Court's present ambivalence regarding the seizure of papers
reflects a more basic uncertainty about the structure of the fourth
amendment. The amendment has two separate clauses: one prohib-
its "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and the other sets out
prerequisites for the issuance of a warrant.16 Many Supreme Court
decisions treat the search and seizure clause as if its sole effect is
10 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976).
1 See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search warrant for newspa-
per's photograph files); cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (inquiry into editorial
process allowed in defamation suit); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (subpoena of
reporter's testimony before grand jury).
2 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). Wigmore had attacked Boyd as sow-
ing "the seeds of a dangerous heresy." 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2264, at 867 (2d ed. 1923).
IS Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976). But see id. at 415 n.1, 427 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (personal diary protected under privilege against self-incrimination).
The lower courts have also been sensitive to the contents of diaries. See United States v.
Blank, 459 F.2d 383, 386-87 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. United States,
402 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nora. Mooring v. United States, 369 U.S. 844 (1962); United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp.
187, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-08 & n.9 (1976) (noting that purely
evidentiary materials may be seized under proper circumstances and reserving question of
whether there are some materials of evidentiary value whose nature precludes search and
seizure); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967) (same). The Court reiterated the
traditional rule regarding private papers as recently as in General Motors Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355-56 (1977) (citing Boyd).
" Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
- 16 See supra note 2 (text of fourth amendment).
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to permit searches without a warrant if the search itself is not "un-
reasonable. '17 Under this interpretation the mere existence of a
warrant meeting the requirements of the warrant clause would
fully satisfy the fourth amendment;18 neither documents nor any
other objects enjoy absolute or even special protection from
seizure. Another line of decisions, however, holds that the warrant
clause and the search and seizure clause establish distinct constitu-
tional rights,1 9 and thus even a search based on a valid warrant is
impermissible if otherwise "unreasonable."20 This alternative read-
ing of the fourth amendment requires a separate inquiry into
1'7 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 n.25 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976).
18 The most complete articulation of this view is in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978). Holding that police could enter and search a newsroom with a search warrant
issued ex parte, the Court argued:
[The prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the warrant require-
ments with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endan-
gered by the search. As we see it, no more than this is required where the warrant
requested is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the
premises occupied by a newspaper. Properly administered, the preconditions for a
warrant... should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly
threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.
Id. at 565. The warrant requirements, the majority suggested, "struck the balance between
privacy and public need ... ." Id. at 559. See McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of
Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 Ind. L.J. 55, 72 (1977)
(assuming that if requirements of warrant clause are satisfied, search will be held
reasonable).
Other portions of Zurcher back away from this extreme position. The Court held that
"overall reasonableness" is a precondition for the issuance of any warrant, in effect reading
the search and seizure clause into the warrant clause. The Court noted that the standard of
reasonableness depends on the location to be searched and the articles to be seized. 436 U.S.
at 564-65. The majority emphasized that its opinion did not "assert that searches, however
or whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on prob-
able cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized."
Id. at 559-60. The Supreme Court's differing views of the significance of the search and
seizure clause are noted in Comment, supra note 1, at 279 n.32.
I" See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 n.23 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 757-58 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist has been particularly outspoken in emphasizing the preemi-
nence of the search and seizure clause. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
20 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
257 (1979); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 351 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); McKenna, supra note 18, at 81-82 (noting the
arguments in favor of an independent "reasonableness" requirement).
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whether a seizure of papers based on a warrant is reasonable.
The Supreme Court's inconsistent interpretation of the fourth
amendment's structure parallels the Court's changing view of the
amendment's historical origins. The Court has correctly empha-
sized that the fourth amendment was written in response to a
"long misuse of power in the matter of searches and seizures both
in England and the colonies,"21 and that it was intended to place
in the Constitution the rights guaranteed by several famous Eng-
lish court decisions of the 1760's.22 Preeminent among these deci-
sions is Entick v. Carrington," which the Supreme Court has often
cited as the "wellspring of the rights now protected by the Fourth
Amendment. '24
The Court's opinion in Boyd interpreted Entick as forbidding
any seizure of private papers," and thus as providing a specific
historical basis for construing the search and seizure clause to con-
tain such a prohibition. 6 More recently, however, the Court has
2, Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
2 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
376-77 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
626-27 (1886).
A number of decisions construe the fourth amendment in light of the common law as it
stood before the adoption of the fourth amendment. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 217 (1981) ("common law may, within limits, be instructive" in determining intent of
the framers); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (the common law is "relevant, if
not entirely dispositive"); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
11 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). The most complete report of the
Entick decision is in Howell's State Trials, which took the statement of the case from Wil-
son's Reports but then presented "the Judgment itself at length, as delivered by the Lord
Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from written notes." 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029.
24 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (footnote omitted); see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967); War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 314-15 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1932); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30
(1886).
15 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-30; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 577 n.1 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 & n.18 (1947); United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932). This was also the view of nineteenth-century
commentators. See 3 T. May, The Constitutional History of England Since the Accession of
George the Third, 1760-1860, at 2-9 (5th ed. 1875).
" See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (asserting that the fourth amend-
ment was intended to protect against practices condemned in England, "such as ... general
warrants... and the seizure of... private papers").
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described Entick as a condemnation only of general warrants,2 7
providing no basis for reading into the search and seizure clause
any requirements beyond those in the warrant clause. The earlier
interpretation is more accurate. In the eighteenth century, general
warrants, which the fourth amendment condemns,"8 were warrants
that failed to name the individual possessing the things to be
searched or seized.29 Today, however, the Court characterizes a
warrant as "general" if it fails to specify the things to be searched
or seized, regardless of whether it names the individual possessing
them.30 Although the warrant in Entick did not meet this more
modern requirement of specificity, the warrant included all the in-
formation the courts of the 1760's demanded.3 1 Thus, the Entick
court invalidated the seizure not because the court regarded the
underlying warrant as a general warrant, but because the seizure
violated the distinct prohibition on seizures of papers.
This article argues that the Supreme Court's original view of the
history and meaning of the fourth amendment was correct: seizures
of papers were condemned in eighteenth-century England without
respect to the validity of any underlying warrant, and the search
and seizure clause thus embodies requirements independent of the
warrant clause.32 Part I discusses the eighteenth-century English
27 See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327-28 (1972) (Doug-
las, J., concurring); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1967). Several opinions advancing a hybrid construction of Entick preceded
these decisions. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (Entick con-
demns a general warrant to seize papers); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) (En-
tick forbids the use of general warrants to seek mere evidence).
Recent commentators widely agree that Entick concerned general warrants. See E.
Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 71 n.1 (1957); 1 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.1 at 4 (1978); G. Rude,
Wilkes and Liberty 28-30, 193-94 (1962); Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, Part One, 3 U. Rich. L. Rev. 278, 287 (1969).
28 See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 583 & n.21 (1980); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
29 See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 316 n.3 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85
(1894) (warrant included incorrect name).
10 See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979); Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
3' The warrant referred to Entick by name, and thus its validity was not in issue. See
infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
32 A number of commentators have suggested that private papers should enjoy some de-
gree of special protection under the fourth amendment. See McKenna, supra note 18, at 56
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decisions, including Entick, and concludes that the case law of that
era had two separate branches. One branch forbade general war-
rants and led to the adoption of the warrant clause; the other, ex-
emplified by Entick, prohibited the seizure of certain papers and
lies behind the search and seizure clause. Part II, relying on de-
bates in Parliament and on a series of widely circulated pamphlets,
describes the public controversy in the 1760's over the English gov-
ernment's search and seizure practices. It shows that the use of
general warrants and the seizure of private papers were attacked
on distinct grounds in the public arena as well as in the courts.
Part III suggests several basic principles of fourth amendment ju-
risprudence that this history appears to require. First, the search
and seizure clause forbids the inspection of innocent private papers
in the course of a search for inculpatory documents that by them-
selves are unprotected by the fourth amendment. Second, an as-
sessment under the search and seizure clause of the reasonableness
of a seizure of private papers should take into account the problem
of compulsory self-incrimination. Third, the fourth amendment
strictly limits court-compelled production of documents by the de-
fendant in a suit or prosecution for libel or other speech-related
activity.
I. THE ENGLISH CASES
The fourth amendment is based in large part on six celebrated
English court decisions, including Entick v. Carrington,"3 handed
down in the two decades prior to the American Revolution. 3' All
(greater strictness in application of warrant clause requirements for searches and seizures of
private papers); Comment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626, 648-50 (1974) (seized papers should be im-
pounded and read by magistrate in camera); Comment, supra note 1, at 274 (propriety of
seizure of incriminating papers should be determined by balancing several factors). Only one
recent article has suggested that such protection has a historical basis and is warranted by
the origins of the fourth amendment. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers,
16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 461, 463-64 (1981).
33 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
' Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1075 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v.
Halifax, 19 How. St. Tr. 1406 (C.P. 1769); Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763);
Beardmore v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1405 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1404, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). See supra note 22. Apparently, fifteen similar but
unreported cases preceded Huckle, of which thirteen were settled. See Huckle, 19 How. St.
Tr. at 1405, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 (Bathurst, J.).
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six cases involved unsuccessful efforts by the English government
to apprehend the authors and publishers of allegedly libelous "
publications, most notably the then famous North Briton No. 45.36
The decisions attracted considerable public attention in both Eng-
land 7 and the American colonies.3 8
Most commentators, as well as the recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court, regard these cases as considering only the legality of
general warrants.3 9 The cases, however, actually consider two dis-
tinct issues: first, the validity of general warrants, and second, the
absolute immunity of certain property from search or seizure. En-
tick, the most renowned of the decisions, held that the government
35 In the eighteenth century, libel of public officials was a felony. See infra note 85 and
accompanying text. For the history of the crime of libel, see N. Hentoff, The First Freedom:
The Tumultuous History of Free Speech in America 61-68 (1980); L. Levy, Emergence of a
Free Press 5-15 (1985); F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776, at 117-20,
269-75, 380-92 (1965).
"6 The content and impact of North Briton No. 45 is discussed in G. Rud6, supra note 27,
at 22-23; 0. Sherrard, A Life of John Wilkes 86-88 (1930); C. Trench, Portrait of a Patriot:
A Biography of John Wilkes 98-101 (1962).
-7 G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 24-30, 34; 0. Sherrard, supra note 36, at 97-104; C. Trench,
supra note 36, at 113-22.
" Professor Rossiter notes that the American press "was full of his trials, tribulations,
and speeches, so full indeed that one may go to almost any issue of any newspaper between
1763-1775 and read of John Wilkes," the author of North Briton No. 45. C. Rossiter, Seed-
time of the Republic 527 n.158 (1953). Between June 1763 and May 1764 the weekly Boston
Gazette, and Country Journal carried 36 separate stories about Wilkes, as well as an adver-
tisement for a pamphlet entitled "An Authentick Account of the Proceedings Against John
Wilkes . . . Containing all the Papers relative to this interesting affair, from that Gen-
tleman's being taken into Custody by his Majesty's Messengers to his Discharge .... "
Boston Gazette, and Country Journal, July 4, 1763, at 3, col. 2. A story summarizing the jury
verdict in favor of Wilkes explained: "By this important decision, every Englishman has the
satisfaction of seeing, that his house is his castle, and is not liable to be searched, nor his
papers pried into by the malignant curiosity of King's Messengers, and an utter end put to
that unconstitutional practice .... ." Boston Gazette, and Country Journal, Feb. 20, 1764,
at 4, col. 1.
Wilkes' extensive following in the American colonies is discussed in B. Bailyn, The Ideo-
logical Origins of the American Revolution 110-12 (1967); Maier, John Wilkes and American
Disillusionment with Britain, 20 Win. & Mary Q. 373 (1963). "'Wilkes and Liberty' were
toasted from New England to South Carolina. Towns were named after him-such as
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. . . -as were children, for instance, the Boston Son of Liberty
Nathaniel Barber's son Wilkes." P. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution 163 (1972). The
number "45" was displayed throughout the colonies as a sign of resistance, just as it was in
England. I. Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning 191, 194 (1965) (American use
of "45"); C. Trench, supra note 36, at 121 (English use of "45").
" See supra note 27.
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could not seize private papers even with a valid warrant.40 The En-
tick court foreshadowed the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment's search and seizure clause by holding that seizures of certain
papers are impermissibly intrusive, that they may improperly in-
criminate the author with his own words, and that the power to
search and seize documents should not be available in libel cases.41
A. The General Warrants Cases
Huckle v. Money,42 the first reported decision on general war-
rants, arose from the arrest of a journeyman printer suspected of
having helped print North Briton No. 45. John Money, one of the
lesser crown officials known as messengers, arrested William
Huckle with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State, Lord Hali-
fax.43 Huckle brought a civil action for damages against Money.
Neither Huckle nor the court questioned Halifax's authority to is-
sue arrest warrants," and the case involved no search or seizure of
evidence. The court, however, characterized the warrant as "gen-
eral" because it did not specifically order the arrest of Huckle. The
warrant merely directed Money and others "to apprehend and
seize the printers and publishers of. . .the North Briton. .. .
Lord Chief Justice Pratt, sustaining a jury verdict for Huckle,
commented that the jurors saw the Secretary of State
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempt-
ing to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting upon the
legality of this general warrant .... To enter a man's house by
virtue of a nameless warrant ... is worse than the Spanish Inqui-
sition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an
hour; it was a most daring public attack made upon the liberty of
the subject.4'
The jury awarded Huckle £300 in damages although he had been
40 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1073, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818.
41 See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
41 19 How. St. Tr. 1404, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
43 Id. at 1405, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
" The Secretary of State's authority to issue arrest warrants was expressly upheld in
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1048-59 (C.P. 1765).
40 Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
46 19 How. St. Tr. at 405, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 (emphasis added). An earlier passage in the
report also describes the warrant as a "general warrant." 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
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in custody only six hours.4"
Wilkes v. Wood,4 8 decided in the same year as Huckle, was cap-
tioned "The Case of General Warrants" when reported in 1790.11
John Wilkes, a member of Parliament, brought a trespass action
against Robert Wood, another of the King's messengers. Wood and
several other officials, acting under a warrant issued by Lord Hali-
fax, had entered Wilkes' home, searched it for several hours, and
seized all the papers and manuscripts they found.50 The warrant
was similar to the one in Huckle. It ordered the seizure of the au-
thor and printers of North Briton No. 45 along with their papers,
but did not identify any individuals by name.51
As in Huckle, neither the plaintiff nor the court objected to the
fact that the warrant failed to specify the papers to be seized,52 or
that it had not been issued by a judge. Justice Pratt observed that
instead the issue was "whether a Secretary of State has a power to
force persons houses, break open their locks, seize their papers, &c.
upon a bare suspicion of a libel by a general warrant, without name
of the person charged." 53 At the close of the trial, Justice Pratt
singled out the failure to identify the suspect as the warrant's fatal
defect:
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons
houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a gen-
eral warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken
away, and where no offenders names are specified in the warrant,
and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search
wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is
truly invested in a Secretary of State, and he can delegate this
power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every
man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.5'
'7 Money treated Huckle "very civilly by treating him with beef-steaks and beer, so that
he suffered very little or no damage." 19 How. St. Tr. at 1405, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
"I Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
49 Id. at 1, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489.
50 Id. at 4-5, 98 Eng. Rep. at 491.
" A similar warrant is reproduced in Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1008, 97 Eng.
Rep. 1075, 1078 (K.B. 1765). See infra note 59.
52 An open-ended authorization to seize all papers would be invalid under the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1979).
Wilkes, Lofft at 3, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
Id. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
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Justice Pratt instructed the jury to return a verdict in Wood's
favor only if Wilkes was in fact the author of North Briton No. 45
and the search and seizure was therefore justified.5 5 The jury
found in favor of Wilkes, awarding him £1000 in damages.56
Leach v. Money57 was the only general warrants case decided by
the King's Bench. Dryden Leach sued John Money and two other
messengers for trespass and false imprisonment after they entered
Leach's house, arrested him, and held him for several days on sus-
picion of printing North Briton No. 45.58 The warrant used to ar-
rest Leach did not name him or any other suspect;5 9 accordingly,
both eighteenth-century case reporters characterized Leach as con-
cerning "general warrants." 60 Because Leach clearly had not
printed North Briton No. 45, the court's final opinion, upholding a
jury verdict in his favor, concluded that even a valid warrant could
not provide a defense to Leach's claim.6
At least one member of the court, however, indicated a more far-
reaching basis for finding in favor of Leach. 2 Lord Mansfield
55 Id. at 17-18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. The court warned the jury that a decision against
Wilkes might be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Id. at 19, 98 Eng.
Rep. at 499.
88 Id. at 4-19, 98 Eng. Rep. at 491-99.
19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765).
68 Id. at 1003-05, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1075-77.
89 The warrant, again issued by Lord Halifax, stated:
George Montague Dunk, earl of Halifax .... one of the lords of his majesty's most
honourable privy council, lieutenant-general of his majesty's forces, and principal sec-
retary of state, &c. -
These are in his majesty's name to authorize and require you, taking a constable to
your assistance, to make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers, and pub-
lishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, intitled, 'The North Briton, No. 45...'
and them or any of them having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their
papers, and to bring in safe custody before me, to be examined concerning the prem-
ises, and further dealt with according to law. In the due execution whereof, all may-
ors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, constables, and all others his majesty's officers civil
and military, and loving subjects whom it may concern, are to be aiding and assisting
to you, as there shall be occasion. And for your so doing, this shall be your warrant.
Given at St. James's, the 26th day of April 1763, in the third, year of his majesty's
reign. Dunk Halifax. To Nathan Carrington, John Money, James Watson, and Robert
Blackmore, four of his majesty's messengers in ordinary.
Id. at 1008, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1078.
10 Id. at 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1075.
*1 Id. at 1028. The court's final opinion in Leach is consistent with Justice Pratt's instruc-
tion to the jury in Wilkes. See text accompanying supra note 55.
11 See N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution 46-47 (1937).
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framed the issue as "whether this general warrant be good," and
concluded that it was not, "upon the single objection of the in-
certainty of the person, being neither named nor described
... *"63 He explained that "[i]t is not fit, that the receiving or
judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain di-
rections to the officer. '64
The warrant's failure to refer to Leach by name was thus its crit-
ical flaw.6 5 The three other members of the court agreed with Lord
Mansfield that the warrant was invalid, although they did not ex-
plain their reasons. Hargrave's 1775 annotation commented that
"all the four judges thought general warrants to seize the person
universally illegal, except where the granting of them was specially
authorized by act of parliament .. ".."66 With the decision in
Leach, the prohibition against general warrants, that is, against
warrants that failed to identify the individual whose person or
property were to be seized, was firmly established in English law.
B. Entick and the Seizure of Papers
Entick v. Carrington6 7 arose under circumstances similar to
Wilkes."' In an attempt to locate the author of several allegedly
libelous editions of the Monitor, Nathan Carrington and three
other messengers forcibly entered John Entick's home, read
through Entick's books and papers, and seized several hundred
pamphlets and charts.69 Entick sued Carrington and the others for
trespass. 70
19 How. St. Tr. at 1026, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088.
Id. at 1027, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088. Mansfield's reference to "the magistrate" apparently
includes Lord Halifax.
65 Neither the arguments of counsel nor Lord Mansfield's opinion refer to the failure of
the warrant to specify Leach's home as a place to be searched for the printer of North
Briton No. 45.
" Id. at 1028. Insofar as Lord Mansfield concluded that Parliament could authorize gen-
eral warrants, he disagreed with Justice Pratt. Pratt held that the general warrant in Wilkes
was "contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution," Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at
499, and declared that "[n]o precedents, no legal determinations, not an Act of Parliament
itself, is sufficient to warrant any proceeding contrary to the spirit of the constitution." Id.
at 490.
19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
68 See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
19 How. St. Tr. at 1030-32.
70 Id. at 1030-32. The jury returned a special verdict, finding most facts as alleged by
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The warrant the messengers relied on in Entick, however, dif-
fered in one crucial respect from the warrants in Huckle, Wilkes,
and Leach. Instead of vaguely commanding the messengers to ar-
rest and to seize the papers of "the authors, printers and publish-
ers" 7' of certain editions of the Monitor, the warrant expressly
named Entick as the suspect whose possessions were to be seized.72
Thus, the warrant's specific identification of Entick distinguished
it from the general warrants at issue in the other decisions. Indeed,
not once do either the lengthy arguments of counsel or the opin-
ions refer to the Entick warrant as a general warrant. By contrast,
the opinion twice describes Leach as the "Case of General War-
rants. 73 Hargrave's annotation explained that Entick involved all
the issues presented in Leach "except the question of General
Warrants.
7 4
Because Entick did not involve a general warrant as defined in
the eighteenth century, the case has relatively little bearing on the
meaning of the fourth amendment's warrant clause. The decision,
however, is clearly critical to the meaning of the search and seizure
clause. The phrase "search and seizure" or its equivalent, although
not appearing in any of the general warrants cases, was repeatedly
used by Lord Camden in Entick.75 Neither the court nor the plain-
tiff's counsel suggested that the defendants' conduct was illegal be-
cause of a procedural defect in the warrant, or that a valid warrant
would have been a defense to the trespass alleged. The court con-
demned the very nature of the search and seizure, not the underly-
ing warrant.
Lord Camden's opinion offered three different rationales, with
distinct ramifications for the meaning of the search and seizure
clause, in upholding Entick's claim. First, Lord Camden argued
Entick, but deferring to the court on the issue of whether the messengers had acted illegally.
Id. at 1032-36.
71 See supra note 59 (text of the warrant in Leach).
7' The warrant ordered the messengers to "make strict and diligent search for John En-
tick, the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly very seditious papers, intitled
the Monitor, or British Freeholder ... and him, having found you are to seize and appre-
hend, and to bring, together with his books and papers, in safe custody before me to be...
dealt with according to law ... " 19 How. St. Tr. at 1034.
71 Id. at 1063, 1068.
7' Id. at 1029.
75 Id. at 1042, 1064, 1066, 1068, 1069, 1071, 1072. In addition, the plaintiff termed the
defendants' conduct "unreasonable." Id. at 1039.
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that the government may not ordinarily seize an individual's
property:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure
their property .... By the laws of England, every invasion of pri-
vate property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set
his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an
action, though the damage be nothing .... If he admits the fact,
he is bound to shew by way of justification, that some positive law
has empowered or excused him."
In a number of instances, the court noted, some property could be
seized "for the sake of justice and the general good. '7 7 Private pa-
pers, however, "are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his
dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they
will hardly bear an inspection .... ,,78 If searches and seizures of
papers were permitted, "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every
subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and in-
spection of a messenger, '7 9 and an individual's "most valuable
secrets"80 could be exposed to government scrutiny. Lord Camden
traced the search and seizure of papers to the discredited practices
of the Star Chamber,8' and to an opinion of the infamous Chief
Justice Scroggs.s2
Second, the court emphasized that preventing and punishing li-
bel did not justify seizing papers. The court noted that because
English law punished the publication, writing, or even possession
of a libel, many homes were potentially subject to search:
whenever a favourite libel is published (and these compositions are
apt to be favourites) the whole kingdom in a month or two be-
comes criminal ....
He that has it or has had it in his custody; he that has published,
copied, or maliciously reported it, may fairly be under a reasonable
76 Id. at 1066.
7 Id. (the "right of property is set aside by positive law" in such cases as "[d]istresses,
executions, forfeitures, taxes, &c.").
768 Id.
79 Id. at 1063.
so Id. at 1064.
61 Id. at 1069.
82 Id. at 1070. William Scroggs, Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1678 to 1681, was
impeached in 1681. He has been described as "undoubtedly one of the worst judges who
ever disgraced the bench." D. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law 1121 (1980).
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suspicion of having the thing in his custody, and consequently be-
come the object of the search-warrant.8 3
The court rejected the argument that the seizure of papers in libel
cases was necessary to prevent sedition, refusing to distinguish po-
litical from nonpolitical libel or to consider a "state necessity" jus-
tification.8 4 Thus, any warrant "to seize and carry away the party's
papers in the case of a seditious libel" was held "illegal and
void." 5
Third, the court rejected the idea that the government could
seize papers for use as evidence in a criminal case:
it is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means
of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases
had been shewn, where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's
custody by process ...
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and
yet there are some crimes, such for instance as murder . .. that
are more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no pa-
per-search in these cases to help forward the conviction. 6
In Lord Camden's view, the law deliberately refused to authorize
"paper searches" in order to prevent forced self-incrimination:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and
unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed
upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be con-
founded with the guilty.8 7
Of the three rationales advanced by the court in Entick, the first
19 How. St. Tr. at 1072.
Lord Camden noted:
[W]ith respect to the argument of state necessity, or a distinction that has been
aimed at between state offences and others, the common law does not understand
that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take notice of any such distinctions.
If the king himself has no power to declare when the law ought to be violated for
reason of state, I am sure we his judges have no such prerogative.
Id. at 1073.
85 Id. at 1074.
84 Id. at 1073.
07 Id. Paper searches were also denounced as forcible self-incrimination in Wilkes v.
Wood, Lofft 1, 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (C.P. 1763) ("Nothing can be more unjust in itself,
than that the proof of a man's guilt shall be extracted from his own bosom.").
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and third stand for the principle that the government can never
seize private papers, with or without a valid warrant."" The second
rationale bars seizures of papers only in libel cases. Commentators
at the time regarded the decision as establishing both rules. For
example, Hargrave's 1775 annotation describes the Entick decision
both as "against the seizure of papers"89 and as holding that "a
warrant to search for and seize the papers of the accused, in the
case of a seditious libel, is contrary to law."90 All three aspects of
the court's opinion had an important impact on the framers' un-
derstanding of the fourth amendment's search and seizure clause.
II. THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY IN ENGLAND
Searches, seizures, and general warrants were not only the sub-
ject of litigation, but were also the focus of a public controversy
that raged in England throughout the 1760's. The public debate,
like the cases discussed in Part I, treated general warrants and the
seizure of papers as independent issues. Critics of the two practices
traced them to different historical abuses: they compared general
warrants to the nameless warrants for which Justice Scroggs had
been impeached,9' and analogized the seizure of papers to the
8 Although Entick does at one point discuss the procedures used to obtain the warrant,
improper procedure clearly was not an alternative basis for invalidating the search. Defen-
dants' counsel attempted to analogize the search and seizure of papers to searches and
seizures of stolen goods, an established practice at common law. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at
1040. The court rejected the analogy for three reasons. First, the court pointed out that
stolen goods do not belong to the person from whom they are seized. Id. at 1066. Second,
the court noted that the common law rule permitting searches for stolen goods was "the
only case of the kind," and held that the courts should adopt another such rule only if
expressly authorized by an act of Parliament. Id. at 1067. Finally, the court noted that the
issue and execution of a search warrant for stolen goods involved several procedural safe-
guards not present in Entick, including an oath by the owner of the goods. Id. The court did
not, however, conclude that the search in Entick was unlawful because the defendants had
not followed the procedures applicable to a search warrant for stolen goods. Instead, the
court reasoned that if paper searches were legal the common law would have established
comparable procedural safeguards; because the law had not, paper searches were illegal. Id.
88 Id. at 1075-76.
90 Id. at 1029.
"I See, e.g., Father of Candor, A Postscript to the Letter on Libels, Warrants, &c. in an-
swer to a Postscript in the Defence of the Majority, and Another Pamphlet, entitled, Con-
siderations on the Legality of General Warrants 12-13 (2d ed. London 1765) [hereinafter
cited as A Postscript]. A facsimile reproduction of the 1771 edition of A Postscript, with
slight modifications and expanded footnotes, may be found in Libels, Warrants and
Seizures: Three Tracts 1764-1771, at 140 (1974). All cites in this article, however, refer to
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sweeping seizures used in the seventeenth century to enforce the
Licensing Acts.2 Like the English courts, the commentators op-
posing the seizure of papers sought a prohibition against that prac-
tice in order to protect innocent private papers from government
inspection93 and to prevent compulsory self-incrimination, 94 and
noted that enforcement of libel laws was an especially inappropri-
ate basis for such an intrusion.95
Neither the arrests of Leach and Huckle nor the seizure of En-
tick's papers, however, significantly affected the debates in Parlia-
ment or the salvos of pamphlets exchanged on these issues. The
public controversy centered mainly on the arrest of John Wilkes
and the seizure of his papers in April 1763.96 For the remainder of
the second London edition of 1765.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Scroggs' opinions, see N.
Lasson, supra note 62, at 38-39.
92 See, e.g., Father of Candor, A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of
Papers 59 (5th ed. London 1765) (referring to the Licensing Act under Charles U) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Letter From Father of Candor]. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. In
1695, the House of Commons refused to renew the Licensing Act, objecting that the Act
allowed:
[A]ll men's houses-as well peers' as commoners'-to be searched at any time, either
by day or night, by a warrant under the sign-manual, or under the hand of one of the
secretaries of state, directed to any messenger, if such messenger shall, upon probable
reason, suspect that there are any unlicensed books there; and the houses of all per-
sons free of the Company of Stationers are subject to the like search on a warrant
from the master and wardens of the said company or any one of them.
XI H.C. Jour. 305 (1695); see also N. Lasson, supra note 62, at 31-34, 37-39 (detailing the
abusive search and seizure practices of the 1600's).
93 See, e.g., infra notes 116-17, 217 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., infra notes 123, 167-68 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., infra notes 121, 160, 169 and accompanying text.
01 See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
The passage of the cider tax in March 1763 occasioned a preliminary debate over searches
of private homes and set the stage for the Wilkes controversy. Like other excise taxes, the
cider tax was enforced by providing crown officials with the power to enter any building at
will to detect evasions of the tax. Act of March 31, 1763, 3 Geo. 3, ch. 12, § X. William Pitt,
later Lord Chatham, attacked the proposed cider tax because it would result in searches of
private homes. Stating that every man's home is his castle, Pitt objected that the tax would
"necessarily lead to introducing the laws of excise into the domestic concerns of every pri-
vate family, and to every species of produce of the land. The laws of excise are odious and
grievous to the dealer, but intolerable to the private person." 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1307
(1813).
The close relationship between the issues raised by the cider tax and those raised later in
the year by the Wilkes affair is illustrated by the curious historiography of Pitt's famous
remark concerning private property. Cooley's version of that statement, which he attributes
to a speech by Pitt on general warrants, reads:
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the decade, Wilkes' repeated confrontations with both Parliament
and a series of administrations elicited strong public support for
his cause on both sides of the Atlantic. The Wilkes controversy
spawned ideas, described in the following sections, that played a
significant role in the development of the fourth amendment.9 7
A. The Wilkes Affair
On April 26, 1763, Lord Halifax issued a warrant directing the
seizure of "the authors, printers and publishers" of North Briton
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 365 n.4 (5th ed. 1883). Lieber, writ-
ing in the same era, gives a rather different account of Pitt's statement, but also attributes
it to a speech on general warrants by "the great Chatham": "Every man's house . . . is
called his castle. Why? Because it is surrounded by a moat, or defended by a wall? No. It
may be a straw-built hut; the wind may whistle around it; the rain may enter it; but the
King cannot." F. Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government 60 (3d ed. 1877). Goodrich,
on the other hand, offers a version similar to Cooley's, but asserts that the remark was made
during a speech on the excise tax:
The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter
it; but the King of England can not enter it! All his power dares not cross the thresh-
old of that ruined tenement!
C. Goodrich, Select British Eloquence 65 (1852) (emphasis in original). None of these ver-
sions appears in the published debates of the House of Commons. Whichever version and
attribution is correct, that the same remark might with equal plausibility be associated with
opposition to the excise tax and an attack on general warrants indicates the close relation-
ship between the two issues.
The Supreme Court has referred to Pitt's remark on a number of occasions. See United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n.31 (1982) (Goodrich text); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 229 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (no text; remark attributed to Pitt while
Prime Minister although he was not Prime Minister during either his speech on the excise
tax or his speech on general warrants); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980)
(Goodrich text; dated March 1763, the time of Pitt's excise tax speech); id. at 609 n.3
(White, J., dissenting) (no text; attributing remark to speech on the excise tax); Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Goodrich text; attributing
remark to speech on the excise tax); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (Good-
rich text; attributing remark to speech on the excise tax).
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the Wilkes controversy to an
understanding of the fourth amendment. See United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297, 328-29 n.6 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
483-84 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 728-29 & n.22 (1961); Frank v. Ma-
ryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 626-27, 630 (1886); see also infra notes 235-50 and accompanying text (describing in
detail the relationship between the controversy and the framing of the fourth amendment).
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No. 45.98 On April 29, Lord Halifax directed Nathan Carrington
and several other messengers to execute the warrant on Wilkes,
based on statements by the publisher and the printer of North
Briton No. 45 that Wilkes was the pamphlet's author.9 9 The mes-
sengers appeared at Wilkes' home on the morning of April 30, but
did not detain him. Wilkes went to the office of the printer of the
North Briton, where he reportedly destroyed the original manu-
script of No. 45.100 When Wilkes returned to his home, the messen-
gers arrested him and seized all his papers,10 1 which they brought
to Lord Halifax. Later that day, Halifax and the Earl of Egremont,
the other Secretary of State, issued a second warrant that referred
to Wilkes by name and that ordered his imprisonment in the
Tower of London. 10 2 Wilkes' attorney obtained from Justice Pratt
a writ of habeas corpus directed to the messengers, but the order
was of no effect because Wilkes was no longer in the messengers'
custody.103
On May 3, Wilkes and his attorney appeared before the Court of
Common Pleas, again seeking an order directing Wilkes' release.
By this time Wilkes was being held pursuant to the April 30 spe-
cial warrant, not the general warrant of April 26. Both Wilkes and
Justice Pratt had earlier challenged the legality of the April 26
general warrant, 04 but by May 3 it was technically no longer at
98 See supra note 59 (full text of warrant).
9 N. Lasson, supra note 62, at 44; G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 23-24; C. Trench, supra note
36, at 101.
100 G. Rude, supra note 27, at 24. Other authors have suggested that Wilkes visited the
printer's office to protect the next edition of the North Briton from destruction. See, e.g., C.
Trench, supra note 36, at 104.
101 Halifax reportedly told Carrington to seize all Wilkes' papers. C. Trench, supra note
36, at 103.
102 The warrant, addressed to the constable of the Tower, read:
These are in his majesty's name to authorize and require you to receive into your
custody the body of John Wilkes, esq. herewith sent you for being the author and
publisher of a most infamous and seditious libel intitled the North Briton number 45
tending to inflame the minds and alienate the affections of the people from his maj-
esty and to excite them to traiterous insurrections against the government and to
keep him safe and close until he shall be delivered by due course of law and for so
doing this shall be your warrant.
English Liberty: Being a Collection of Interesting Tracts, From the Year 1762 to 1769; Con-
taining the Private Correspondence, Public Letters, Speeches, and Addresses, of John
Wilkes, Esq. 81 (London 1769) [hereinafter cited as English Liberty].
,01 G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 24.
I- Id. at 24, 29.
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issue. Accordingly, Wilkes' counsel argued at the May 3 hearing
that Wilkes was wrongfully being imprisoned, but did not attack
the April 26 warrant. 10 5 Wilkes, in his own address to the court,
objected to the seizure of his papers but did not mention the gen-
eral warrant under which he was originally apprehended. 06 Wilkes
addressed the court at a subsequent hearing on May 6, and again
did not discuss the April 26 general warrant. Instead, he objected:
my house [has been] ransacked and plundered; my most private
and secret concerns divulged .... Such inhuman principles of
star-chamber tyranny will, I trust, by this court, upon this solemn
occasion, be finally extirpated, and henceforth every innocent man,
however poor and unsupported, may hope to sleep in peace and
security in his own house, unviolated by King's messengers, and
the arbitrary mandates of an overbearing Secretary of State.10 7
Justice Pratt recognized Wilkes' immunity from arrest as a mem-
ber of Parliament and ordered him freed. 08
Although Wilkes was released from custody and seemed pro-
tected from criminal prosecution, his papers remained in the pos-
session of Lord Halifax. 09 On the day of his release Wilkes sent an
audacious letter to Halifax and the Earl of Egremont asserting that
his house had been robbed and demanding the return of the "sto-
len goods" in their possession.1 0 Halifax wrote to Wilkes
explaining:
your papers were seized in consequence of the heavy charge
brought against you, for being the author of an infamous and sedi-
tious libel .... [S]uch of your papers, as do not lead to a proof of
your guilt, shall be restored to you: such as are necessary for that
105 Id. at 26. The issue of this second, special warrant temporarily frustrated Wilkes' pre-
existing plan to challenge the legality of general warrants. 0. Sherrard, supra note 36, at 96.
10 Wilkes complained, "[m]y papers have been seized, perhaps with a hope the better to
deprive me of that proof of [the government's] meanness, and corrupt prodigality ..
English Liberty, supra note 102, at 84.
107 Id. at 87-88.
108 G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 27. Parliament subsequently declared that the immunity
did not extend to the writing of libels. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
109 At least some of those papers were never returned. G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 24, 28.
110 English Liberty, supra note 102, at 89-90. Wilkes unsuccessfully sought a warrant to
search the homes of Halifax and Egremont for his papers. Id. at 90.
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purpose, it was our duty to deliver over to those, whose office it is
to collect the evidence, and manage the prosecution against you."'
Wilkes' response complained without elaboration that his papers
had been seized under an "illegal warrant," and emphasized his
determination to "assert the security of my own house."" 2
Less than two weeks after Wilkes' release, the first of a series of
pamphlets on the Wilkes affair was published. A Letter to the
Right Honorable Earls of Egremont and Halifax, His Majesty's
Principal Secretaries of State, on the Seizure of Papers1 ad-
dressed only the seizure of Wilkes' papers and not the general war-
rant under which he was first arrested. The author noted that al-
though earlier discussion had focused on the scope of Wilkes'
parliamentary immunity from arrest, the "SEIZURE OF PAPERS is
.. . of greater importance, or more general concern, as a QUESTION
OF LIBERTY, interesting in the highest degree to EVERY SUBJECT in
the kingdom. 1 1 4
A Letter to Egremont and Halifax argued that seizures of pa-
pers were "unprecedented and illegal" for several related rea-
sons.11 5 First, disclosure of confidential information about personal
or business affairs might cause irreversible harm:
The merchant has his secrets of trade; the philosopher his discov-
eries in science. Every accurate man has the impenetrable secret of
his circumstances; the state of his affairs. Many have their Wills,
settlements, and dispositions of their estates, sealed up in silence
not to be broke, but with their own heart-strings .... A man's
riches may be there in things known to none but himself; and his
poverty may from thence only appear, the unseasonable discovery
of which may involve him in irreparable ruin.116
1 Id. at 90-91.
112 Id. at 91-92.
11 (London 1763) [hereinafter cited as Letter to Egremont and Halifax].
4 Id. at 5-6.
11 Id. at 31. The author acknowledged that papers could be seized in the case of treason
so "that the sinews of rebellion may be cut." Id. at 22. But treason necessitates "a certain
necessary rigour and severity ... which would be cruelty, if extended to other crimes." Id.
The author also had reservations about using seized papers at the trial of alleged traitors,
arguing that "surely it cannot be law even in cases of treason ... that papers found in a
man's closet, not published, and unconnected with any thing but themselves, can constitute
a crime, or be brought as a proof of guilt." Id.
16 Id. at 8. The harm caused by the seizure of papers could not be undone: "The mischief
and damages occasioned by the seizure of papers must in every case be very great, in many
infinite, and irreparable; such as no consideration, no restitution can compensate, no satis-
faction indemnify." Id. at 7.
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Second, personal papers often contain an individual's most pri-
vate thoughts, never intended to be disclosed to anyone else,
"things that the world never saw and no man has a right to look
upon": 11
7
Papers ... are our closest confidents; the most intimate compan-
ions of our bosom; and next to the recesses of our own breasts, they
are the most hidden repository we can have. Our honour and fame,
our estates, our amusements, our enjoyments, our friendships, are,
and even our vices may be, there: things that men trust none with,
but themselves; things upon which the peace and quiet of families,
the love and union of relations, the preservation and value of
friends, depend. l8
Third, an individual's papers ordinarily include confidential
communications with others; seizure would expose those confi-
dences and affect people other than the owner of the papers.119
The result would be
an end of confidence amongst mankind. A severe restraint is laid
upon friendship and correspondence, and even upon the freedom
of thought .... [H]e will be the wisest man that corresponds the
least with others, and the most prudent who writes very little, and
keeps as few papers as he can by him. None but a fool in this case
will have any secrets at all in his possession. 120
Seizures of confidential communications in libel cases, "in which
POLITICS, PARTY, PREJUDICE and RESENTMENT will always have a
great influence," would be particularly unfortunate.'21
Finally, A Letter to Egremont and Halifax attacked the state-
ment in Halifax's letter to Wilkes 122 that the papers seized would
be used against Wilkes in a subsequent criminal proceeding:
What was the pretence of this late violation of rights so sacred in
their nature, this invasion of property, in a critical point, which
comprehends every valuable interest a man can have? A person is
suspected of being the author of a printed paper, which, in the
judgment of the secretaries of state, was a seditious libel, and the
117 Id. at 25.
I's Id. at 8-9.
119 Id. at 10-11.
120 Id. at 25-31.
121 Id. at 30.
122 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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proof of the fact is to be sifted out of his own papers: for your
lordships have said in your letter, which is published, that such of
the papers seized, as tend to make out the guilt of the owner are to
be kept, and used for that purpose ....
If there is a circumstance that can aggravate the injury, which is
in itself too great almost to be conceived, it is this use that is to be
made of the papers ....
When a person is brought upon his trial for any offence, he is
not bound, nor will any court suffer him to give evidence against
himself; but by this method, if allowed, though a man's tongue is
not permitted to bear testimony against him, his thoughts are to
rise in judgment, and to be produced as witnesses to prove the
charge. A man's WRITINGS lying in his closet, NOT PUBLISHED, are
no more than his thoughts, hardly brought forth even in his own
account, and, to all the rest of the world, the same as if they yet
remained in embrio in his breast .... 113
Although A Letter to Egremont and Halifax drew no distinc-
tions among papers, the arguments it advanced do not compel the
conclusion that all papers should be immune from seizure. The au-
thor of the pamphlet was primarily concerned with personal
secrets, private reflections, confidential correspondence, and other
papers analogous to an individual's thoughts "in embrio in his
breast. ' 124 Business records, for example, thus would not implicate
the values articulated in A Letter to Egremont and Halifax. This
distinction was of little importance to the Wilkes controversy be-
cause the messengers apparently had seized every scrap of paper
they found in Wilkes' home. 2 5 Thus, the author did not need to
consider explicitly whether a search and seizure limited to noncon-
fidential business or household records would be permissible.
A Letter to Egremont and Halifax also contains a brief passage
suggesting that defects in the April 26 warrant aggravated the
abuse inherent in the seizure of Wilkes' papers. Specifically, the
"23 Letter to Egremont and Halifax, supra note 113, at 19-21. See also id. at 24-25 ("[no]
man should be deprived of any benefit, or advantage, his own silence, or the secrecy of
papers not published, can afford to protect him against conviction. As he can keep his
mouth shut, so his privacies ought to be sacred, and his repositories secure."). The author
compared Wilkes' situation to that of the widely-regarded seventeenth-century author Al-
gernon Sydney, who prior to the Glorious Revolution had been convicted of treason and
executed on the basis of an unpublished essay found in his home. Id. at 16-17.
124 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
115 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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author objected that the messengers did not have "so much as a
pretence of a warrant naming the owner.' 12 6 The defective war-
rant, however, was not the underlying problem; it merely made the
already unacceptable seizure of papers more intolerable. Nothing
in A Letter to Egremont and Halifax suggests that the seizure
would have been proper if the warrant had named Wilkes. The au-
thor discussed warrant procedure nowhere else in the pamphlet,
and never used the term "general warrant."
Later in the year, another pamphlet appeared that objected pri-
marily to the warrants under which Wilkes had been impris-
oned. 127 Observations upon the Authority, Manner and Circum-
stances of the Apprehension and Confinement of Mr. Wilkes,
Addressed to Free-Born Englishmen128 argued that the April 26
warrant, which the author called a "general warrant,"'2 9 gave the
messengers a dangerous authority to arrest anyone they pleased:
If such a warrant is of any authority at all, might not the messen-
gers, to whom it is directed, have gone to the houses of and seized
the persons of any of the Dukes, Princes of the Blood Royal, of my
Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of Canterbury, or any great of-
ficer of State, Peer or Coommoner of the realm? .. .Is not this,
then, a pretty discretion to lodge in four of the King's, ordinary
messengers ...?so
In order to discover the authors and publishers of North Briton
NVo. 45, the messengers might conduct sweeping investigations, re-
ceive evidence, and administer oaths. The author complained that
these functions were improperly delegated to messengers "who
have till now been considered only as a higher sort of postmen or
letter carriers . ,,1.I Messengers were "very little practised in
the law," however learned they might otherwise be. 13 2
Observations went on to attack the warrant of April 30. Because
it identified Wilkes by name, the April 30 warrant was not a gen-
I26 Letter to Egremont and Halifax, supra note 113, at 12. In addition, the warrant was
issued "without information upon OATH by virtue of a VERBAL ORDER of a secretary of
state." Id.
127 See supra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text.
128 (London 1763) [hereinafter cited as Observations].
129 Id. at 22.
130 Id. at 7.
131 Id. at 9-10.
132 Id. at 11.
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eral warrant as that term was used in the 1760's. Nevertheless, the
author argued that the warrant was defective because it asserted
no basis for imprisoning Wilkes: "Mr. Wilkes' name is prudently
inserted in the warrant . . . . But tho' Mr. Wilkes is named in the
warrant, it proceeds upon no charge by oath, no view of the magis-
trate committing, nor any other ground whatever in the war-
rant."133 Moreover, the pamphlet noted that the Secretaries of
State, who issued the warrant, were apparently also the sole source
of whatever evidence supported it.134 Observations called on Eng-
lish juries to award damages for "invasions" under both war-
rants, 35 and urged Parliament to make clear that the warrants
were illegal.1 6
Observations articulates most of the requirements later stated in
the fourth amendment's warrant clause, except the requirement
that warrants describe the place to be searched.3 7 The author thus
advanced a much broader argument than the opinions of the
courts in the general warrants cases.138 Observations did not sug-
gest, however, that a proper warrant could authorize "a general
seizure of papers."13 9
The arguments in Observations against seizures of papers were
distinct from its criticisms of general warrants. The pamphlet reit-
erated several contentions from A Letter to Egremont and Hali-
fax, objecting that the government had revealed to the public the
content of some of Wilkes' papers,1 40 and that the Secretaries of
State planned to use the papers to prove Wilkes' guilt.141 The au-
133 Id. at 22.
134 Id. at 22-23 ("The Secretaries of State are witnesses; they are the magistrates too; they
charge, they commit upon their own testimony ..
135 Id. at 35.
136 Id. at 32-33.
137 See supra note 2 (text of fourth amendment).
138 See supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text.
139 Observations, supra note 128, at 14.
110 The author asserted:
It was not dealing according to the law with the papers of a private gentleman seized,
on any pretence whatever, to publish in newspapers the secrets and privacies of them,
as has been done in the instance now under consideration. This is a part of the illegal
proceeding the most inexcusable; it is an irreparable injury to the person immediately
affected by it, his family and friends; an insult upon the public, and a high breach of
trust in those who have been guilty of it.
Id. at 14. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
14 Observations, supra note 128, at 17. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
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thors of A Letter to Egremont and Halifax and Observations thus
viewed general warrants and seizures of papers as presenting inde-
pendent issues.
B. Initial Parliamentary Debates, 1763-64
Developments in the second half of 1763 focused public debate
on the government's use of general warrants in libel cases. In the
search for the authors and publishers of various editions of the
North Briton and the Monitor, authorities in 1762 and 1763 had
arrested 48 persons in addition to Wilkes under general warrants.
Wilkes urged a number of those arrested to sue the government
officials involved, and in late 1763 William Huckle and Dryden
Leach won substantial damage awards. 142 On December 6, a jury
awarded Wilkes himself £1000 in damages against the messengers
after Justice Pratt condemned general warrants as "a rod of iron
for the chastisement of the people of Great Britain.2 4
3
Developments were considerably less favorable for Wilkes in
Parliament, where Lord Halifax was among the leadership of the
majority, and where many members viewed Wilkes' growing popu-
larity with horror rather than with admiration. The opposition, led
by William Pitt, initially embraced Wilkes and his cause, seeing an
opportunity to increase their own public support. 44 In the fall of
1763, however, the government obtained a copy of a satirical poem
entitled An Essay on Women, which Wilkes had helped compose.
All sides in Parliament regarded the work as blasphemous and
libelous. 145 The House of Lords voted unanimously to condemn An
Essay on Women as "a most scandalous, obscene, and impious li-
bel.' 46 Meanwhile, the House of Commons resolved by a vote of
273 to 111 that North Briton No. 45 was "a false, scandalous, and
seditious libel," and ordered it burned in public. 47
Observations also suggested that government officials might use seizures of papers to obtain
and to destroy evidence of their own misconduct. Observations, supra note 128, at 15.
142 Huckle and Leach were awarded £2900 and £400 respectively. G. Rud6, supra note 27,
at 28. See supra notes 42-47, 57-66 and accompanying text.
140 . Sherrard, supra note 36, at 105. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
144 O. Sherrard, supra note 36, at 100-113.
145 G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 33.
146 Id. In the House of Commons, even Pitt denounced Wilkes as "the blasphemer of his
God, and the libeller of his King." 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1364 (1813).
147 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1359-60 (1813); G. Rude, supra note 27, at 33. A crowd disrupted
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Despite his popularity with the public, Wilkes' legal position be-
came increasingly precarious. In November 1763 the House of
Commons resolved that parliamentary immunity did not extend to
the crime of libel,148 thus exposing Wilkes to prosecution for hav-
ing written North Briton No. 45 and An Essay on Women. Wilkes
fled to France, and in early 1764 was expelled from Parliament. He
was subsequently indicted for seditious libel, and the King's Bench
formally declared him an outlaw when he failed to appear to face
the charges. 149
The exile of Wilkes removed a source of trouble for the govern-
ment, but the opposition in Parliament still pressed for a decision
on the legality of Lord Halifax's conduct. The opposition renewed
Wilkes' complaint, made before his exile, that his arrest and the
seizure of his papers under a warrant "in which no person was
named in particular" violated his rights as a member of Parlia-
ment.1 50 Sir William Meredith placed a resolution before the
House of Commons: "That a General Warrant for apprehending
and seizing the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious libel,
together with their papers, is not warranted by law." 5" Supporters
of the resolution argued that the warrants Lord Halifax had issued
conferred sweeping authority on the messengers to act "in such
manner, and against such persons as their informer should think
fit to advise.'15 2 Thus, although the resolution literally concerned
the burning of North Briton No. 45, and burned instead a pair of jackboots and a petticoat,
symbolizing Lord Bute and the Dowager Princess. 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1380-86 (1813); J.
Owen, The Eighteenth Century 1714-1815, at 177 (1974).
14 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1362 (1813). The vote in the House of Commons was 258 to 133. Id.
The House of Lords, after a heated debate, concurred in the resolution. Id. at 1365-78.
14 G. Rud6, supra note 27, at 35.
15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1360-61 (1813).
Id. at 1413. The majority proposed several successful amendments. In its final form,
the resolution read:
That a General Warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers, and pub-
lishers, of a seditious and treasonable libel, together with their papers, is not war-
ranted by law. Although such warrant has been issued according to the usage of
office, and hath been frequently produced to, and so far as appears to this House,
the validity thereof hath never been debated in the court of King's-bench; but the
parties thereupon have frequently been bailed by the said court.
Id. at 1416 (amended language in italics).
"" Id. at 1411. Pitt admitted that he had issued general warrants himself in 1760, know-
ing at the time that they were illegal. N. Lasson, supra note 62, at 49. Pitt defended his past
conduct on the ground that England was then at war, but insisted that Lord Halifax's "ex-
traordinary and wanton exercise of an illegal power, in this case, admits of no justification"
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only libel cases, the primary argument in its favor was more
broadly framed.
The language of the resolution left unclear whether the seizure
of papers was an issue independent of the issue of general war-
rants. The one account of the debates that clearly mentions
seizures of papers, however, appears to indicate that supporters of
the resolution considered such seizures improper whether or not
ordered by a general warrant:
A general warrant not expressing the name of the party to be ap-
prehended, is void in law: for it is leaving it to the arbitrary discre-
tion of a common officer to arrest persons, and search what houses
he thinks fit; and the seizure of papers has frequently been con-
demned as illegal. 153
The government made no attempt to defend its treatment of
Wilkes. Its spokesmen argued instead that the House of Commons
should take no action on legal issues that were the subject of pend-
ing litigation."' Supporters of the resolution responded that the
pending suits against Lord Halifax and the messengers did not jus-
tify parliamentary inaction, and condemned the government's ar-
gument as "eva[sion] by a pretence that is false, is a mockery of
justice, and an imposition on the House." '155 A motion to postpone
consideration of the resolution nevertheless passed, by the narrow
margin of 232 to 218.151
C. Public Reaction to the Stalemate
The decision of the government to oppose parliamentary action,
although undoubtedly intended to quiet the Wilkes controversy,
because "the nation was in perfect tranquility; the safety of the state was in no danger." 15
Parl. Hist. Eng. 1402 (1813).
153 Id. at 1408. Whether this passage is an account of statements made in the House of
Commons or simply the view of the reporter, Sir George Yonge, M.P., is unclear. Even the
reporter's view is of interest, however, because it was written contemporaneously with the
debates.
- Id. at 1396, 1401, 1409, 1413.
'55 Id. at 1403.
6 Id. at 1401. Following the vote Sir John Phillips unsuccessfully sought permission to
introduce "a Bill to declare General Warrants and the Seizure of Papers illegal, by an act of
parliament, except in certain cases, and under such limitations, as should be mentioned and
described in the said act." Id. at 1406. This summary of the bill clearly suggests that Phil-
lips regarded general warrants and seizures of papers as raising independent issues.
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had the opposite effect. The public's concern about general war-
rants and seizures of papers was compounded by frustration that a
majority of the House of Commons had failed to address the is-
sues. A broadside of the era listed the dissenting members of Par-
liament beneath the heading: "In most societies of this metropolis,
the healths of the following gentlemen are drank as friends to lib-
erty, and anxious to protect their fellow-subjects from having their
persons imprisoned, their houses broke open and searched, and
their papers seized without lawful process. '15 7 A new round of
pamphlets, published in the remainder of 1764 and in 1765, contin-
ued to treat general warrants and seizures of papers as indepen-
dent problems.
Charles Townshend, a member of Parliament who had opposed
postponing consideration of the general warrants resolution, wrote
the first of these new publications, A Defence of the Minority in
the House of Commons.15 8 Most of the pamphlet attacked the
postponement on the ground that general warrants were not, in
fact, the issue in any pending suit.""9 In support of the resolution
itself, Townshend argued that because it condemned general war-
rants only in libel cases, it did not
preclude the use of general Warrants issued by Secretaries of State
in every extreme case, which imagination can put or which Neces-
sity would justify .... I may think it justifiable in Consideration
of the public Danger, the nature of the Offence, the Necessity of
Secrecy and Dispatch in preventing such Conspiracies against the
public Weal, to connive at the use of general Warrants of Appre-
hension; but in the Case of a Libel already published, where the
Mischief is done, where the Degree of the public Danger is compar-
atively so small, and the Offence itself, to the reproach of our
Laws, so very vague and undefined, I may and do think that such
unlimited Power, over the Persons and goods of all Subjects, is
neither necessary nor expedient to be lodged in any Hands.'
Apparently, Townshend objected to general warrants primarily be-
cause they granted unlimited discretion to messengers.' A De-
157 A copy of this broadside is at the Beinecke Rare Book Library at Yale University
(Broadsides 4, By 6, 1765).
"' (London 1764) [hereinafter cited as A Defence of the Minority].
159 Id. at 7-31.
160 Id. at 5-6.
"I, See id. at 35; see also supra note 152 and accompanying text (House of Commons
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fence of the Minority did not discuss the legality of seizures of
papers.
A Letter From Candor to the Public Advertiser162 discussed gen-
eral warrants and seizures of papers separately, and treated them
as distinct issues. The pseudonymous Candor argued against gen-
eral warrants that "ordinary Messengers, having nobody named in
such warrant, might by virtue thereof have taken up ever so many
persons in the kingdom . *...""' In addition, Candor objected to
the general warrant Lord Halifax had issued because it was not
based on sworn evidence: "Even if somebody had been named in
the warrant, must there not be an Information upon oath, of his
being Author, Printer or Publisher?' '1 4
Candor argued separately that seizures of papers were impermis-
sible even "if somebody were named and alleged to be charged
upon oath with being Author, Printer, or Publisher of a Libel.' 1 65
As had the author of A Letter to Egremont and Halifax, Candor
regarded the use of private papers against their owner in a criminal
proceeding as a species of compulsory self-incrimination. 16  Per-
mitting seizures of papers, even if based on sworn allegations,
would lead to the seizing of a man and his papers for a libel,
against whom there was no proof, merely slight suspicion, under a
hope that, among the private papers of his bureau, some proof
might be found which would answer the end. It is a fishing for
evidence, to the disquiet of all men, and to the violation of every
private right; and is the most odious and infamous act, of the worst
sort of inquisitions .... It is, in short, putting a man to the tor-
ture, and forcing him to give evidence against himself. 6 7
Candor objected that putting one's thoughts on paper could never
by itself constitute a crime:
debates on general warrants resolution).
1I (2d ed. London 1764) [hereinafter cited as A Letter From Candor]. Although nomi-
nally in the form of a letter, A Letter From Candor was a forty-page pamphlet, first printed
in 1764, and reprinted in three editions by 1770. A facsimile of the second edition appears in
Libels, Warrants and Seizures: Three Tracts 1764-1771 (1974), although it does not appear
in the table of contents of that book.
'63 Id. at 30.
164 Id.
165 Id.
' See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
167 A Letter From Candor, supra note 162, at 31.
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Since the . . . reign of the last Stuart, every man that has the
faintest notions of Law or Liberty, must know the position
Scribere est agere [to write is to act] has been condemn'd, and that
the mere writing and leaving in one's own study, any discourse
whatever, is not criminal, it being no act which the Law takes no-
tice of; for, any man is at liberty to think, and to put what
thoughts he pleases on paper, provided he does not publish
them. 68
Although the seizure of papers might have been justified under
some circumstances, Candor concluded that the practice had so
much potential for abuse that it should be completely forbidden:
by degrees, men known to be in opposition to the Ministry...
would have their studies rummaged, whenever a galling or abusive
pamphlet came out, published, perhaps, on purpose; under a frivo-
lous pretence, that they were rumored to be the writers or editors
of it; but really and truly, for the sake of getting at private corre-
spondence and connections, and for the business of disarming op-
position .... 169
If seizures of papers were permitted in libel cases "it would soon
become usual, under the pretence of better keeping the Peace, to
exercise this power in very ordinary cases. '17 0
Later in 1764, a response to A Defence of the Minority was pub-
lished under the title A Defence of the Majority in the House of
Commons, on the Question Relating to General Warrants, In An-
swer to the Defence of the Minority.' The pamphlet argued pri-
marily that general warrants were indeed at issue in a number of
cases pending when Parliament had refused to adopt a resolution
on the matter. 72 A Defence of the Majority also responded to the
contention in A Defence of the Minority that libel was too minor
an offense to justify resort to a general warrant, 73 not by arguing
that general warrants were innocuous or ordinarily legal, but by
insisting that libel was a particularly dangerous crime. Seditious
libel was not "a Sort of harmless Sport, a mere Exercise of Wit and
188 Id. at 30.
18 Id. at 31-32.
170 Id. at 31.
171 (London 1764) [hereinafter cited as A Defence of the Majority]. The authorship of the
pamphlet is generally attributed to Charles Lloyd, the secretary to George Grenville.
171 Id. at 21-28. For the opposing argument, see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
M See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Talents, and innocent Exertion of the Liberty of the Press," but
rather "the subtle Poison that creeps imperceptibly through every
Vein; the Seed of Jealousy, Revolt, and Civil Discord: and is at
least the Parent of Treason, if not the Offspring of it."1174 The au-
thor stopped short of actually supporting general warrants, how-
ever, and made no attempt to justify seizures of papers.
A Defence of the Majority also correctly pointed out that the
resolution before the House of Commons, which condemned "a
general warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers
and publishers of a seditious libel, together with their papers,""1 5
had been vaguely worded. A prohibition against general arrest war-
rants directing the seizure of the unnamed suspect's papers might
not forbid either a general arrest warrant with no reference to pa-
pers or a "particular warrant, describing the person, for the seizing
of the papers."11' The author argued that if such interpretations
were possible, the resolution was "no security at all.''7 A Defence
of the Majority thus recognized the minority's intent to prohibit
all seizures of papers, including those conducted under an other-
wise valid warrant.
The next pamphlet in the exchange, A Letter Concerning Libels,
Warrants, the Seizure of Papers, and Sureties for the Peace or
the Behaviour; with a View to some Late Proceedings and the De-
fence of Them by the Majority, s was the longest and most widely
circulated publication arising out of the Wilkes controversy. Writ-
ten under the pseudonym Father of Candor, the pamphlet first ap-
peared in October 1764, and by 1765 had been published in five
editions.1 79
7' A Defence of the Majority, supra note 171, at 12-13, 21.
175 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
178 A Defence of the Majority, supra note 171, at 17-18.
177 Id. at 18. The author also argued that a resolution prohibiting general warrants in libel
cases might be read as sanctioning such warrants in other cases. Id. at 37. The drafting
problems were subsequently corrected. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
178 Letter From Father of Candor, supra note 92.
179 The first edition (London 1764) is entitled An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately
Propagated, Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers; with a View to Some
Late Proceedings and the Defence of Them by the Majority; upon the Principles of Law
and the Constitution: In a Letter to Mr. Almon From the Father of Candor. The second
edition (1764) bore the title indicated in the text, and continued under that title in subse-
quent editions. All references in this article are to the fifth London edition (1765). Facsimile
reproductions of the first (1764) and seventh (1771) London editions may be found in Li-
bels, Warrants and Seizures: Three Tracts 1764-1771 (1974). A facsimile reproduction of the
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Father of Candor distinguished general warrants and seizures of
papers in unambiguous terms: "a General Warrant is good in no
case whatever, for the apprehension of persons or papers, or both;
and. .. a Particular, or any Warrant, for seizing papers, is like-
wise, as the law now stands, good in no case whatever . .. "18o He
also attacked a suggestion in A Defence of the Majority that the
resolution before the House of Commons, by expressly referring
only to libel cases, might sanction general warrants and seizures of
papers relating to other crimes. ' ' He noted that because the gov-
ernment had used general warrants and seizures of papers only in
libel cases, Parliament had no reason to condemn other possible
abuses: "when a parliament condemns any thing in one case, it in-
timates a disapprobation of every similar case and of every the like
species, altho' not named expressly in their resolution."' 2 Father
of Candor argued that resolutions of Parliament "in a great consti-
tutional point" should not be construed with "that kind of quib-
bling which is tolerated" in less important matters.183
Father of Candor's attack on general warrants was based on the
familiar objection that they relied on
the discretion of a common officer to arrest what persons, and
search what houses he thinks fit: and if a Justice cannot legally
grant a blank warrant for the arrest of a single person, leaving it to
the party to fill it up, surely he cannot grant such a general war-
rant, which might have the effect of an hundred blank warrants.'"
Father of Candor argued further that the higher officials who is-
sued general warrants might also abuse their discretion.'8 5 He
therefore opposed general warrants even in emergency situations:
bad men, as one may easily figure to one's self, will be apt to lay
first edition is also in Father of Candor, An Enquiry Into the Doctrine Lately Propogated
Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers (Da Capo Press 1970).
,80 Letter From Father of Candor, supra note 92, at 77.
18! See A Defence of the Majority, supra note 171, at 37.
18, Letter From Father of Candor, supra note 92, at 68. See also id. at 81-82 ("where a
practice has obtained in a high office, which is clearly contrary to law ... it seems to me
that the very thing which a House of Commons would naturally do, is, to come to a resolu-
tion, damning that practice, and to go no farther ... .
, Id. at 78.
Id. at 47.
188 Id. at 51 (general warrants provide "a handle to all ministers to be guilty of the great-
est abuses, impunedly, and under the colour of law").
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stress upon such acts of necessity, as precedents for their doing the
like in ordinary cases, and to gratify personal pique. . . .If such
warrants were to be allowed legally justifiable in any instances, it
would be exceedingly difficult, nay, impossible, to restrain Minis-
ters from grievously oppressing any man they did not like, under
many pretences, from time to time, for their own safety, without
any motive of public good.18 6
Like the author of A Letter to Egremont and Halifax, Father of
Candor opposed seizures of private papers because of the secrets
and confidences these documents contained. 187 He described in
graphic terms the inevitable invasion of privacy:
What then, can be more excruciating torture, than to have the low-
est of mankind, such fellows as Mooney, Watson, and the rest of
them, enter suddenly into [a person's] house, and forcibly carry
away his scrutores, with all his papers of every kind .... These
papers are immediately to be thrown into the hands of some clerks,
of much curiosity, and of very little business in times of peace, who
will, upon being bid to sort and select those that relate to such and
such a particular thing, naturally amuse themselves with the peru-
sal of all private letters, memorandums, secrets and intrigues, of
the gentleman himself, and of all of his friends and acquaintance of
both sexes. In the hurry too of such business, notes, bonds, or even
deeds, and evidence of the utmost consequence to private property,
may be divulged, lost, torn or destroyed, to his irreparable
injury.28 8
In addition, Father of Candor denounced the use of a criminal de-
fendant's private papers against him as "making a man give evi-
dence against and accuse himself, with a vengeance." 8 9
Father of Candor also argued that even if Wilkes' papers were
not absolutely immune from seizure, the search of his home was
improper because of the basis and scope of the warrant:
186 Id. at 49-50.
187 Father of Candor asserted:
Many gentlemen have secret correspondences, which they keep from their wives, their
relations, and their bosom friends. Every body has some private papers, that he
would not on any account have revealed. A lawyer hath frequently the papers and
securities of his clients; a merchant or agent, of his correspondents.
Id. at 54. See also supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text (argument in A Letter to
Egremont and Halifax).
188 Letter From Father of Candor, supra note 92, at 54-55.
189 Id. at 56.
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Nothing... can be forcibly taken from any man, or his house en-
tered, without some specific charge upon oath. The mansion of
every man being his castle, no general search warrant is good. It
must either be sworn that I have certain stolen goods, or such a
particular thing that is criminal in itself, in my custody, before any
magistrate is authorized to grant a warrant to any man to enter my
house and seize it. Nay further, if a positive oath be made, and
such a particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon
the paper or thing sworn to and specified, and in the presence of
the owner, or of somebody intrusted by him, with the custody of it.
Without these limitations, there is no liberty or free enjoyment of
person or property, but every part of a man's most valuable posses-
sions and privacies, is liable to the ravage, inroad and inspection of
suspicious ministers, who may at any time harass, insult and ex-
pose, and, perhaps, undo him. 190
A document that was "criminal in itself," such as a forgery, might
be subject to seizure, but there could be no "taking [of] all papers
indiscriminately. . . . Nothing can be touched, without some crim-
inal charge in law specifically sworn against it. And where there is
even a charge against one particular paper, to seize all, of every
kind, is extravagant, unreasonable and inquisitorial." 191
Father of Candor's insistence that a warrant must specify the
place to be searched and the thing to be seized was criticized in A
Candid Examination of the Legality of the Warrant Issued by the
Secretaries of State for Apprehending the Printers, Publishers,
etc. of a Late Interesting Paper.1 9 The author argued that
searches not meeting Father of Candor's proposed requirement
were nonetheless "strictly legal, justifiable, and necessary for the
very being and support of the whole System of Government."' 9 8
For example, in the case of the infamous Gunpowder Plot, after a
vague and anonymous threat,
[a] diligent search was ordered to be made in the Parliament-
19o Id. at 58. The reference to a "general search warrant" failing to identify the things to
be searched or seized appears to be the only use of the phrase in the pamphlets of the era.
In all other instances, a general warrant was a warrant that failed to identify the individual
possessing the things to be searched or seized.
191 Id. at 59. An authority to seize all papers, not merely inherently criminal documents,
would render all "correspondences, friendships, papers and studies" subject to "the will and
pleasure of the ministers for the time being, and of their inferior agents!" Id.
"' (London 1764) [hereinafter cited as A Candid Examination].
193 Id. at 4.
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house, and all other rooms and lodgings adjoining, which pro-
duced a discovery of that most enormous treason. If the then Min-
isters should have thought themselves limited by the narrow
bounds, to which at present it is attempted to confine their power
no search could legally have been made, and consequently that
treason could have been known but by its effects. Here was no par-
ticular treason charged, no particular place mentioned, only a gen-
eral power to search, without having any particular object in view,
but to make discoveries by any thing that might occur in the pro-
gress of it. The importance of the object, the Preservation of the
State, authorized and justified the means. 194
A Candid Examination argued that search warrants limited in the
manner Father of Candor proposed might forewarn those in
possession:
It is said, that the particular places to be searched should be dis-
tinctly and minutely specified in the Warrant, and the search re-
strained to those: might not this directly tend to defeat the discov-
ery; if the Messengers, finding the Papers, etc., are not in any place
mentioned in their warrant, are obliged to get a new Warrant,
before they can search other suspected places, may not what is
searched for, be in the interim removed? 19 5
The pamphlet was limited to the proposed specificity requirement
and did not discuss seizures of papers or general arrest warrants.
An unambiguous defense of both general warrants and seizures
of papers was published in late 1764 or early 1765 in Considera-
tions on the Legality of General Warrants, and the Propriety of a
Parliamentary Regulation of the Same.198 The author noted that
general warrants and seizures of papers presented distinct issues,'197
and addressed them separately. Considerations defended general
warrants as necessary in cases where a suspect's name was not
known:
'9, Id. at 7. The author argued that "to destroy this power for the Preservation of the
State, because a Minister might make an improper use of it... is the most glaring and
dangerous absurdity." Id. at 8.
195 Id. at 7-8.
196 (Lofidon 1765) [hereinafter cited as Considerations]. The pamphlet was first printed
no later than January 1765, because it was responded to in a pamphlet dated January 24,
1765. See supra note 91. The first edition (London 1765) is reproduced in facsimile in Li-
bels, Warrants and Seizures: Three Tracts 1764-1771 (1974).
197 Considerations, supra note 196, at 4.
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The slightest Consideration will point out to us Variety of Cases, in
which special Warrants cannot possibly be used; many others may
occur which human Wisdom cannot foresee. Is then the Guilty to
escape, because no nominal Description can be given of him? or is
it lawful, in such Case, to grant a Warrant describing him by other
Marks peculiar to him alone? Suppose a Murder is committed by a
Person, whose Name is unknown in that Part of the Kingdom:
what is to be done? Is the Murderer to be left to escape, because a
nominal Warrant cannot be issued against him? Would the Law, in
such Case, hold a general Warrant to arrest the Person guilty of
the murder, to be illegal, and a Violation of the Liberty of the Sub-
ject? Surely not."9 8
The crucial distinction was not between more and less serious of-
fenses, but between instances "where special Warrants can, and
where they cannot be effectual to lay hold on the guilty Person." 199
Considerations took an intermediate position on seizures of pa-
pers, defending the use of seized papers in a criminal proceeding
but disapproving a general search for papers. The author acknowl-
edged that the law ordinarily provides "protection. . . to the pa-
pers of every individual"20 0 and that "the Papers of every innocent
Man are under its Protection. '20 1 An individual's papers "which
relate to any Crime he has committed" 20 2 should nevertheless be
subject to seizure:
because the Law, from Motives of Compassion, will not oblige the
Party charged to produce any thing against himself, does it follow
that every thing in his Possession is Sacred, and that nothing
found in his Custody is to be used in Evidence by his Accuser?
Does not the daily Practice prove the Falsity of that Idea? Are not
Persons arrested on Suspicion of Felony constantly searched? Are
not the Papers or Goods found upon him produced in Evidence
against him? Is his House more sacred than his Person? Is his
Closet protected, when his very Pockets may be rifled? Is not the
Practice and the Right of searching Houses for stolen Goods uni-
versally admitted? Are not the very Letters, nay the Confessions of
the Accused, used in Evidence of his Guilt? Where then is the Rule
of Law, where the Principle, that no Man is to furnish Evidence
19 Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 9.
200 Id. at 14.
201 Id. at 16.
202 Id. at 14.
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against himself? He is not compelled to do it by his own Act; but
the Prosecutor is at Liberty to avail himself of whatever he can
find in the House, on the Person, under the Hand, or even from
the Mouth of the Accused, to prove the Truth of his Charge.20 3
Considerations condemned, however, "the general and undist-
inguishing Seizure of all Papers whatsoever" because such broad
seizures could not be justified as "necessary. "204
Father of Candor responded to Considerations in early 1765
with A Postscript to the Letter on Libels, Warrants, &c. 20 5 Father
of Candor pointed out that although Considerations undertook to
defend general warrants, it in fact justified only warrants describ-
ing the suspect by "Marks peculiar to him alone. '20 s A warrant
"containing a specific description of a particular person, solely
and peculiarly applicable to him . . . is to all intents and pur-
poses a special warrant. '207 The warrant issued by Lord Halifax,
however, did not contain such a specific description: "A paper or
book has its title printed in the title-page, and it goes every where
by that title; but, no man walks about with the title of 'Author,
Printer or Publisher of the North Briton, No. 45,' imprinted on his
face ... ."208 Father of Candor recognized that general warrants
were subject not only to deliberate abuse, but could also lead to
mistaken arrests:
There is nothing in the countenance of any man . . . which can
determine him to be or not to be the Author, Printer or Publisher
of any piece; so that many innocent men would be causelessly
harassed from vain, light surmises, and idle reports of ignorant, ill-
informed or ill-intentioned people, were such general warrants
received.209
Father of Candor added a new argument to his earlier attack on
general warrants, declaring that only a magistrate should issue a
203 Id. at 13. The author also approved of the seizure of papers related to a crime "to be
afterwards carried into Execution . [to] prevent [its] perpetration." Id. at 11.
204 Id.
205 A Postscript, supra note 91.
'0 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
207 A Postscript, supra note 91, at 8.
208 Id. at 9.
209 Id. Father of Candor noted that many of those arrested under general warrants in
1762 and 1763 were found to be unconnected with the condemned publications. Id. at 10.
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warrant and that he should base his decision on evidence under
oath:
A man to be apprehended at all must be guilty of some breach of
the law; and this must either happen in the view of the magistrate,
or be proved to him by oath, before he can issue a warrant for his
arrest .... It is the province of the magistrate alone to judge, and
no man can delegate his judicial capacity to another. But, if he
grant a discretionary, that is, a general, and not a particular war-
rant, the officer is left to judge for himself... The liberty of
every Englishman would then be left at the mercy of every impu-
dent Bailiff, Constable, Messenger, or Footman, intrusted with
process.21 0
Father of Candor's proposed requirements would have invalidated
not only general warrants but also specific warrants, such as the
April 30 warrant for Wilkes' confinement, not based on sworn
statements."'
Shifting his focus to seizures of papers, Father of Candor at-
tacked as meaningless the distinction Considerations drew be-
tween seizures of all of an individual's papers and seizures only of
particular documents. Even under a warrant authorizing the
seizure only of certain specified papers belonging to an individual,
his house and all his papers may be rummaged and gutted by this
sort of law, that is, upon mere political suspicion, in order ... to
fish for evidence really to prove him a libeller .... Every private
paper, according to this doctrine, might be scrutinized by the ex-
aminer; for, without doing so, how could he determine whether
something could not be proved from thence?212
Father of Candor thus recognized that rummaging through an in-
dividual's papers in search of particular documents involves the
same invasion of privacy whether all papers or only specified pa-
pers are seized.
D. Resumption of Parliamentary Debates, 1765-66
In January 1765, The House of Commons resumed debate on
general warrants and seizures of papers a year after consideration
210 Id. at 11.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
III A Postscript, supra note 91, at 18.
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had been postponed. In the intervening period, A Defence of the
Majority, A Candid Examination, and Considerations had aired a
wide variety of arguments in support of Lord Halifax's warrants.
Nevertheless, no spokesman for the majority openly defended ei-
ther general warrants or seizures of papers. Their primary argu-
ment remained that Parliament should not act while those issues
were pending in the courts.213
The opponents of general warrants, however, raised an entirely
new argument:
[even if] general warrants describing the offence, do not give of-
ficers in general a right to seize the innocent, they throw in the way
of messengers, who are to be so well paid for taking care of the
offender's person, a temptation to enquire into the character and
life of all persons, and thus tend in some shape, to convert these
subordinate ministers of justice into so many spies and informers
... such an enquiry, even when conducted in the discreetest man-
ner, might injure the most virtuous in their reputation and
fortune.214
Because the messengers were not merely authorized by Lord Hali-
fax to apprehend those connected with North Briton No. 45, but
were under orders from him to do so, this sort of overzealous be-
havior was not unlikely.
The House of Commons again treated seizures of papers as a
separate issue. Opponents characterized private papers as "often
dearer to a man than his heart's blood, and equally close,"'2 15 and
warned that papers could too easily be converted into weapons
against their owner:
though a minister may have less temptation to satiate avarice by
the garbling of such papers, he may have what is a great deal
worse, a much stronger [temptation] to glut his revenge, by com-
213 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 7, 13-14 (1813). Although no judicial precedent had explicitly found
general warrants legal, the parliamentary majority noted that in a number of prior cases
individuals held under general warrants had come before the King's Bench seeking bail. In
no case had counsel-who the majority asserted were undoubtedly "lovers of liberty and
very able lawyers"-challenged the warrants. Id. at 13. To question the legality of general
warrants without a court decision "would be impeaching the character" of the King's Bench.
Id. at 12.




bining or disjoining them, so as to make of them engines capable of
working the destruction of the most innocent persons.21
Critics of seizures of papers reiterated Father of Candor's argu-
ment that even a warrant specifying the documents to be seized
would permit the government to rummage through all of an indi-
vidual's papers:
even a particular warrant to seize seditious papers alone, without
mentioning the titles of them, may prove highly detrimental, since
in that case, all a man's papers must be indiscriminately examined,
and such examination may bring things to light which it may not
concern the public to know, and which yet it may prove highly det-
rimental to the owner to have made public .... 21
Sir William Meredith proposed a new resolution: "That a Gen-
eral Warrant for apprehending the authors, printers, or publishers,
of a libel, together with their papers, is not warranted by law, and
is an high violation of the liberty of the subject."'18 In an attempt
to narrow the resolution, George Hay proposed a prefix that read
in part: "That in the particular case of libels, and of no other
crime, it is proper and necessary to fix, by a vote of this House
only, what ought to be deemed the law in respect of general war-
rants .... ,,21 An amendment of this amendment was approved
deleting the phrase "and of no other crime. '220 The House of Com-
mons then adopted the Hay amendment, but subsequently voted
down the resolution as amended.22' This maneuvering confirmed
Father of Candor's understanding that Parliament intended the
resolution to refer to libel only as one instance in which general
warrants were unacceptable.222
In April 1766, the House of Commons reconsidered the matter
and agreed on three resolutions. The first concerned only general
216 Id.
217 Id. at 10-11. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Indeed, some private letters
of Wilkes, it was noted, had improperly been made public as a result of the search of his
home. 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 11 (1813).
218 Id. at 7. This was essentially the same resolution Meredith had proposed a year earlier,
except for the addition of the last eleven words, and the deletion of "seditious" before "li-
bel." See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
11 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 7 (1813).
220 Id. at 8.
221 Id.
22 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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warrants: "That a General Warrant for apprehending the author,
printer, or publisher, of a libel, is illegal; and, if executed on the
person of a member of this House, is also a breach of the privilege
of this House. ' 2 3 A broader version of this resolution was ap-
proved three days later, omitting the reference to libel and assert-
ing that general warrants were illegal in any situation unless spe-
cifically authorized by Parliament.22 4 The third resolution, passed
the same day as the first, dealt separately with seizures of papers:
That the seizing or taking away the papers, of the author, printer,
or publisher, of a libel, or the supposed author, printer, or pub-
lisher, of a libel, is illegal; and that such seizing or taking away the
papers of a member of this House, is a breach of the privilege of
this House.22 5
The condemnation applied whether or not a seizure of papers was
based on a general warrant.
E. Conclusion
The resolutions of April 1766 largely ended the public contro-
versy in England concerning general warrants and seizures of pa-
pers. By that time Parliament and the courts had condemned both
practices, and the government showed no interest in resuming ei-
ther one. In the years that followed, however, commentaries by
members of Parliament and others discussed what had been fought
over and achieved between 1763 and 1766. These pamphlets,
speeches, and public letters played an important role in shaping
public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.
Wilkes continued to complain about the government's conduct
toward him and justifiably claimed credit for having won protec-
tion of the rights of all Englishmen. In a 1766 letter to Lord Graf-
ton, Wilkes remarked:
I please myself ... with the reflection, that no minister has since
dared to issue a GENERAL WARRANT, nor to sign an order for the
SEIZURE OF PAPERS. In the one, the personal liberty of every subject
223 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 208 (1813).
2214 Id. at 209. The second resolution read: "That a General Warrant- for seizing and appre-
hending any person or persons being illegal, except in cases provided for by act of parlia-




is immediately concerned. On the other, may depend not only his
own safety and property, but what will come still more home to a
man of honour, the security, the happiness of those with whom he
is most intimately connected, their fortunes, their future views,
perhaps secrets, the discovery of which would drive the coldest
stoic to despair, their very existence possibly, all that is dear and
sacred in friendship and in love.228
Wilkes cited these same two issues as his claim to fame in a state-
ment printed in London newspapers in March 1768: "The two im-
portant questions of public Liberty, respecting General Warrants
and Seizure of Papers, may perhaps place me among those who
have deserved well of mankind, by an undaunted firmness, perse-
verance, and probity ....
Following his conviction and imprisonment for seditious libel,
Wilkes addressed an open letter to the gentlemen, clergy, and free-
holders of Middlesex County, which the London newspapers
printed in June 1768:
In the whole progress of ministerial vengeance against me for sev-
eral years I have shewn to the conviction of all mankind, that my
enemies have trampled on the laws, and been actuated by the
spirit of tyranny and arbitrary power. The GENERAL WARRANT,
under which I was first apprehended, has been adjudged illegal.
The seizure of My papers was condemned judicially.228
A year later, Wilkes wrote from the King's Bench prison another
description of the government's past attacks on the constitution,
again listing separately "the case of general warrants" and "the
seizure of papers.12 8
These issues were again aired in February 1769 when Parliament
expelled Wilkes for the second time.2 '0 George Grenville's speech
in favor of the motion to expel provoked a detailed public attack
on his own role in the Wilkes affair. A Letter to the Right Honora-
"' English Liberty, supra note 102, at 154. See also id. at 144 (William Pitt "was the
cause that in 1764 no point was gained for the public in the two great questions of GENERAL
WARRANTs, and the SEIZURE OF PAPERS.").
227 Id. at 156. The document was an open letter to the liverymen of the city of London.
228 Id. at 192.
119 A Collection of All Mr. Wilkes's Addresses to the Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders
of the County of Middlesex 25 (London 1769) (letter dated February 16, 1769).




ble George Grenville231 charged Grenville with having personally
"advised a General Warrant and a Seizure of Papers ....
and with blocking parliamentary action on these issues:
The present Lord Chancellor declared from the Bench "that a gen-
eral warrant is unconstitutional, illegal, and absolutely void," and
that he should always consider it as a "rod for the chastisement of
the people of Great Britain," and his Lordship judicially con-
demned the seizure of papers, but you, Sir, long prevented any
Parliamentary censure in either case . . . and till Lord Rocking-
ham's time we do not find the least mark of disapprobation of gen-
eral warrants or the seizure of papers in the House of Commons.2 33
Without Wilkes' "cool perseverance and firmness," the author in-
sisted, "neither general warrants nor the seizure of papers [would
have] been judicially condemned to this hour. 234
The eighteenth-century public controversy in England, like the
cases discussed in Part I, established two independent rights: a
prohibition against general warrants and a limitation on seizures of
papers. These rights sprang from the same tradition of individual
liberty that led to the federal Bill of Rights in America. The re-
strictions on general warrants and seizures of papers are traceable
to the influence of the Magna Carta and its progeny, just as are the
first American colonial charters, the declarations of rights in the
early state constitutions, and the first ten amendments to the fed-
eral Constitution.235 The English common law of searches and
seizures at the time the fourth amendment was adopted thus be-
came part of the American tradition of individual liberty.
The Wilkes controversy also directly influenced the framers of
231 A Letter to the Right Honorable George Grenville, Occasioned by his Publication of
the Speech he made in the House of Commons on the Motion for Expelling Mr. Wilkes,
Friday, February 3, 1769 (London 1769) [hereinafter cited as Letter to Grenville].
232 Id. at 32.
233 Id. at 24. The declaration from the bench was Justice Pratt's. See supra note 143 and
accompanying text. Charles Wentworth, Lord Rockingham, served as prime minister from
July 1765 to August 1766; the reference is evidently to the resolutions of April 1766. See
supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
234 Letter to Grenville, supra note 231, at 27. In 1769, petitions to the King from the
freeholders of Middlesex County and the liverymen of London complained separately about
general warrants and the seizure of papers. English Liberty, supra note 102, at 324, 336.
131 See A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in
America (1968).
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the fourth amendment. 3 s The English search and seizure cases re-
ceived extensive publicity in England and in America," 7 and the
Wilkes case was the subject of as much notoriety and comment in
the colonies as it was in Britain.23 1 Wilkes' cause generated many
supporters among American colonists, some of whom became key
figures in the framing of the Constitution. The Committee of the
Sons of Liberty in Boston, including such early luminaries as John
Adams, Joseph Warren, John Hancock, Josiah Quincy, and James
Otis, corresponded with Wilkes to demonstrate American support
for his cause and to express admiration for his efforts on behalf of
individual liberty.23 9 One member of the Sons of Liberty, William
Palfrey, wrote that "The fate of Wilkes and America must stand
or fall together. '240
The declarations of rights in the early colonial charters and state
constitutions incorporated the English common law of searches
and seizures. Section 10 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,241
for example, although it did not directly refer to the English com-
mon law, demonstrates the important influence of the 1760's con-
M See Bradley, supra note 32, at 463 & n.12; see also N. Lasson, supra note 62, at 13 (the
"events which took place in England ... in the thirty years preceding adoption of the
Amendment... were immediately and directly the moving factors in the elevating of the
principle of reasonable search and seizure to a constititional" significance); R. Perry,
Sources of Our Liberties 427 (1959) ("The fourth amendment grew out of the use by British
officials of general warrants to enforce the acts of trade and to search for seditious publica-
tions."); R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights 1776-1791, at 11 (1955) (The notorious
Wilkes case led to the common law disfavor toward general warrants that "was regarded by
Americans as a correct view of the matter."); C. Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the
United States 226-28 (1894) (The controversy in England over searches and seizures, such as
in the Wilkes case, "excited the sympathy of both England and the colonies" and led to the
adoption of the fourth amendment); J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 238 (1884) ("Such [general] warrants were, however, held illegal by the courts
of justice in England. And this amendment not only pronounces them illegal; but prohibits
Congress from passing any laws to give them effect.").
137 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
2'3 A. Williamson, Wilkes: 'A Friend to Liberty' 192 (1974).
The prisoner in the King's Bench was flooded with goods and good wishes not only
from admirers in England but across the Atlantic. Virginia sent tobacco, and Boston
turtles, to John Wilkes in prison. South Carolina voted him £1,500 to pay his debts.
Id. at 190.
2"I See R. Postgate, That Devil Wilkes 171-78 (1929); A. Williamson, supra note 238, at
192.
240 R. Postgate, supra note 239, at 176.
241 Virginia Declaration of Rights § 10, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A
Documentary History 235 (1971).
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troversy on the development of state bills of rights.242 These bills
of rights expressed the opposition of the American states to gen-
eral warrants 43 and to searches and seizures of papers and private
effects. 2 44
Although the intellectual traditions of individual liberty were
firmly established by 1789, the proposed federal Constitution did
not contain a bill of rights. The opponents of the Constitu-
tion-the Antifederalists245-vigorously opposed a constitutional
framework that did not establish specific limits on national en-
croachment on individual liberties.246 The Antifederalists extracted
promises that the Constitution would be amended to include a bill
of rights in return for their support of ratification.247 The Antifed-
eralists drew on English common law24s and the Wilkes contro-
versy to argue for specific protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against general warrants. Samuel Adams,
one of the most prominent Antifederalists, was a member of the
242 R. Perry, supra note 236, at 304 (the influence of English common law on the Virginia
Declaration of Rights is evident from the condemnation of general warrants in § 10).
24' See, e.g., Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XIV, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz,
supra note 241, at 342 ("[A]nd if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search
in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed
by the laws.").
"4 Id. ("Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions."); Vermont Declaration
of Rights § XI, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, supra note 241, at 323 ("That the people have a
right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free from search or seizure
215 See W. Allen & G. Lloyd, The Essential Antifederalist (1985); 1 H. Storing, The Com-
plete Anti-Federalist (1981).
2,6 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
584 (1983) ("The concerns voiced by the Antifederalists led to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights."); S. Boyd, The Politics of Opposition (1981).
217 S. Boyd, supra note 246. The Antifederalists in key states chose to support ratification
of the Constitution and to work for reform within the system, using the amendment process.
Although they won a bill of rights, they did not accomplish their goals of protecting state
sovereignty, limiting the extent of national power, and augmenting the number of represent-
atives. Id.
248 See, e.g., The Federal Farmer, reprinted in H. Storing, supra note 245, at § 2.8.104-05;
Elbridge Gerry, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 12-13 (P.
Ford ed. 1888); A Farmer, reprinted in H. Storing, supra note 245, at § 5.1.6-13. The Feder-
alists recognized the force of these arguments and took the position that England uniquely
required such protections for individual rights because of the royal monarchy. H. Storing,
supra note 245, at § 2.2 n.1 & § 5.1 n.8.
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Sons of Liberty that corresponded with John Wilkes and declared
him one of the great patriots of his era.24 Robert Whitehill, a dele-
gate to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, argued that absent a
bill of rights, "[t]here is no security, by this Constitution, for peo-
ple's houses or papers. . . .The case of Mr. John Wilkes, and the
doctrine of general warrants show that judges may be cor-
rupted.2 °50 The framers of the Bill of Rights thus relied heavily on
the well-known abuses of searches and seizures in England to per-
suade the states to ratify the fourth amendment to the
Constitution.
The development of the common law of search and seizure in
England and the substantial public discussions surrounding the
Wilkes affair illuminate the background of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court has cited Entick, in particular, as a source of
fourth amendment doctrine:
As every American statesmen, during our Revolutionary and form-
ative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monu-
ment of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ulti-
mate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who
framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were con-
sidered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreason-
able searches and seizures.21'
The array of arguments advanced in opposition to seizures of pa-
pers, especially in view of the very limited extent to which any
spokesman defended such seizures, are of obvious importance in
assessing the circumstances under which the search and seizure
clause provides limited or absolute protection for private papers.
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF PAPERS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The force of the eighteenth-century arguments, both legal and
political, against seizures of papers stems in part from the pecu-
liarly compelling combination of circumstances involved. The
sweeping searches and seizures of the papers of John Wilkes, John
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
200 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the
Constitution by the States: Pennsylvania 526 (M. Jensen ed. 1976).
221 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
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Entick, and others encompassed documents of the most personal
and legally innocuous nature. The allegedly unlawful conduct that
prompted these seizures, the publication of material criticizing the
government, was widely regarded as only a minor offense, if not a
genuine public service. Moreover, the forcible extraction of evi-
dence offended a generation apparently far more sensitive than our
own to compulsory self-incrimination.
Interpreting the fourth amendment in a manner faithful to this
history and to the intent of the framers is thus not a simple task.
Only the most extreme situations 2 12 will involve the same combina-
tion of aggravating factors present in the searches that provoked
the eighteenth-century debate. Most modern cases involve less
abusive practices, less serious invasions of privacy, and nonpolitical
crimes. The application to twentieth-century litigation of the
eighteenth-century principles underlying the fourth amendment
thus requires an analysis of those principles more rigorous and
more detailed than was necessary 200 years ago.
Moreover, many arguments relevant to twentieth-century search
and seizure doctrine were not advanced during the eighteenth-cen-
tury controversy. First, no commentator characterized the warrant
in Wilkes' case as "general" merely because it ordered the indis-
criminate seizure of all his papers, and only one author objected to
this aspect of the seizure.253 Second, because a Secretary of State
was technically a justice of the peace, no author challenged Lord
Halifax's power to issue otherwise lawful warrants. Third, no critic
complained that Lord Halifax or the messengers lacked what we
would today describe as probable cause to arrest Wilkes and to
seize his papers. Fourth, although commentators discussed a wide
variety of confidential papers that deserved immunity from
seizure, none listed the actual document the messengers were seek-
ing: the original manuscript of North Briton No. 45.
A search and seizure of papers whose defects under the warrant
clause might today seem so blatant as to be uninteresting thus
presented to eighteenth-century theorists a very different set of
252 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (four hour search, and seizure of 2000
items based on a warrant authorizing seizure of documents "concerning" the Communist
Party).




problems: intrusion into privacy, forced self-incrimination, and the
widespread chilling of speech-related activity. English courts and
commentators therefore demanded a flat prohibition on seizures of
papers, recognized by the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United
States.254 Although the Court has recently retreated from this
principle, 55 the historical background of the search and seizure
clause at least requires certain safeguards, set forth in the follow-
ing sections. First, inspection of innocent private papers by govern-
ment officials during a search for inculpatory documents must be
forbidden. Second, courts should consider the problem of compul-
sory self-incrimination in determining the reasonableness of a par-
ticular seizure of papers. Third, the availability to plaintiffs and
prosecutors of court-compelled production of documents in libel
and other speech-related cases should be severely limited.
A. Private Papers
The most frequently repeated objection to the search and seizure
in Wilkes' case was that the authorities had taken and examined
his "personal" or "private" papers. 56 Critics focused on the large
volume of unrelated papers government officials read in their
search for documents pertaining to North Briton No. 45. None of
Wilkes' supporters, however, characterized as "private" a docu-
ment that might have proved Wilkes to be the author of the
libelous publication. The seizure of inculpatory documents was ob-
jectionable only because it amounted to self-incrimination, not be-
cause the documents seized were entitled to remain private.
This concern for the confidentiality of innocent private papers
led Wilkes and his supporters to object to all searches and seizures
of papers. They understood that if the government were permitted
to search for any particular document, officials could conduct a
sweeping search to locate that document. Even if the authorities in
the Wilkes case had been seeking only evidence that John Wilkes
had written North Briton No. 45, and thus needed to seize only a
single sheet of paper, the messengers would have had no quick and
easy way to identify that document. If the messengers found on a
table in the foyer of Wilkes' house a file labeled "Editions of the
2- 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
211 See supra notes 9-12 and cases cited therein.
216 See, e.g., supra notes 116-23, 166-70, 187-89 and accompanying text.
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North Briton I have written," no further search would have been
necessary. In the absence of such a convenient coincidence, how-
ever, the only way the messengers could have found the document
they sought was to read every document in the house.
All of Wilkes' papers were seized and removed to government
offices simply for convenience. If the warrant's only defect was its
157 oorder to seize all of Wilkes' papers, instead of only those papers
related to the alleged libel, the messengers could lawfully have
read through every one of Wilkes' papers at his home. Wilkes and
his supporters, however, objected that government officials had
read his private papers, not that they had read them at the wrong
place.
The Supreme Court, mindful of the history of abuses in the
background of the fourth amendment, has cautioned that the
amendment's search and seizure clause does not permit an "indis-
criminate rummaging 2 58 or "a general, exploratory rummaging" 259
through an individual's possessions. A narrowly-drawn search war-
rant ordinarily prevents such open-ended exploratory searches. For
example, in a search for a gun, the primary invasion of privacy is
the physical presence of the police. The search may reveal a cer-
tain amount of information about the owner's personal
life-furniture or clothing tastes, perhaps-but not necessarily
more than would be apparent to a plumber fixing a leaky faucet.
The intrusion is limited because the police can quickly distinguish
a gun from other items the owner may not wish to have closely
inspected, such as a diary, political tracts, or exotic lingerie.260
Because papers cannot so easily be distinguished from each
other, a typical search for a document is necessarily a rummaging
search of the most intrusive kind.261 Although the difference be-
257 Such a warrant might violate the fourth amendment's requirement that warrants "par-
ticularly describ[e]" the objects to be seized. See supra note 2 (text-of fourth amendment).
258 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 62 (1974).
259 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
260 But see State v. Hawkins, 463 P.2d 858, 859 (Or. 1970) (police officers opened a diary
to see if it was hollowed out to contain drugs and "inadvertently" noticed a passage in which
the author confessed to committing a crime).
21 The practical argument for an open-ended exploration of all of a suspect's papers was
candidly made in United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub
nom. Thomas v. United States, 402 U.S. 984 (1971). The court held that "[h]aving found the
letter in the course of a lawful search, the agents [were] entitled ... to read it to see
whether it was an 'instrumentality' for effecting the conspiracy. . . ." 409 F.2d at 897.
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tween a gun and a love letter is so obvious that the police need not
scrutinize the letter, the only way to determine whether a letter
promises a romantic tryst or a sale of cocaine is to read it from
beginning to end. Justice Stewart noted in his dissenting opinion
in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,262 as had Father of Candor two cen-
turies earlier, 63 that a search for even a single document entails a
search through all of an individual's papers:
in order to find a particular document, no matter how specifically
it is identified in the warrant, the police will have to search every
place where it might be-including, presumably, every file in the
office-and to examine each document they find to see if it is the
correct one.
264
Recent experience with seizures of papers amply confirms Jus-
tice Stewart's assertion. In Andresen v. Maryland,2 ss state investi-
gators, acting under a warrant authorizing seizure of all evidence
and instrumentalities of a crime, seized 80 documents from the de-
fendant's offices. The government voluntarily returned 52 and a
state court suppressed 10 others on the ground that they had no
connection to the crime charged.266 Stanford v. Texas267 involved a
four-hour search during which officials seized 14 cartons of materi-
als, including half of the books in the defendant's house, as well as
"many of [his] private documents and papers, including his mar-
riage certificate, his insurance policies, his household bills and re-
ceipts, and files of his personal correspondence. '2 s None of the
documents seized included the Communist Party records men-
tioned in the warrant application.269 In Kremen v. United
States,27 ° federal agents seized the entire contents of a cabin and
262 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
183 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
26 436 U.S. at 573 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504,
515-16, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965) ("even a search for a specific, identified paper may involve
the same rude intrusion [as a general search] if the quest for it leads to an examination of
all of a man's private papers"). Such a thorough search would be as instrusive as the search
Justice Pratt condemned in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(C.P. 1765). See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
26- 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
246 Id. at 466-67.
267 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
268 Id. at 479-80.
269 Id.
270 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
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took them to an office 200 miles away. Of the items seized, "only a
fragmentary part" was ever introduced into evidence.2 7' Similarly,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States2 72 involved "a clean
sweep of all the books, papers and documents found" in the defen-
dant's offices.273
Subpoenas hardly provide more adequate protection. They often
require the production of documents beyond the actual needs of
government prosecutors, and thus can be as overinclusive as out-
right seizures. In Branzburg v. Hayes,2 74 a grand jury investigating
violence and threats of violence by members of the Black Panther
Party subpoenaed from a newspaper reporter all "[n]otes and tape
recordings of interviews . . . reflecting statements made for publi-
cation by officers and spokesmen for the Black Panther Party con-
cerning the aims and purposes of said organization ....
Wheeler v. United States276 involved a mail fraud investigation in
which a grand jury subpoenaed "all the cash books, ledgers, jour-
nals and other books of account" of a firm, together with copies of
every letter or telegram signed by its president or treasurer.27 7 In
1952, a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee directed the executive secretary of the Civil Rights Con-
gress to produce "'all records, correspondence and memoranda
pertaining to the organization of, the affiliation with other organi-
zations and all monies received or expended by the Civil Rights
Congress.' ",278
A narrow warrant specifying what documents to seize but al-
lowing the search of every file to uncover those documents may be
as intrusive as a broad warrant that never identifies the documents
at all. In Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 279 officials conducted a six-hour
search of an adult bookstore in which they viewed films, perused a
271 Id. at 347-48.
22 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
'" Id. at 390. One commentator has observed, "[wlhen 75% of the items seized pursuant
to a warrant are irrelevant to the prosecution's case, that warrant can hardly be said to leave
no discretion to the person executing it." McKenna, supra note 18, at 80.
214 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27' Id. at 675-76 n.12.
278 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
277 Id. at 482-83.
2'7 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 374 (1960) (quoting the subcommittee's
subpoena).
2.7 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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large number of publications, and ultimately ordered the seizure of
431 reels of film and 397 magazines."' Police officials in Zurcher,
rather than seizing all of a newspaper's photographs, searched its
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, and desks. In the end,
nothing was seized.2 8' In Stanley v. Georgia82 police officers
searching for evidence of gambling activities instead found three
rolls of film and arrested the owner for possession of obscene
materials. 28 3 Mapp v. Ohio2s4 involved a search for a bombing sus-
pect in which police ransacked an entire house, looking through
the defendant's photo albums and personal papers, and eventually
discovered several pamphlets that they concluded were porno-
graphic.8 5 In Harris v. United States, s6 five federal agents con-
ducted a "careful and thorough" five hour search of the defen-
dant's apartment looking for stolen checks and instead found
altered draft cards.28 7
Read in light of its historical background, the fourth amend-
ment's search and seizure clause condemns the inspection of inno-
cent private papers by government officials in search of a docu-
ment that by itself may be unprotected. The prohibition applies
equally to private papers read at the owner's home or office and
those seized and read at a government office. If seizable documents
are mixed with constitutionally protected papers so that the for-
mer cannot be identified without reading the latter, the fourth
amendment prohibits a search through the materials, even with a
narrowly-drawn warrant.288
An otherwise seizable document does not, however, obtain im-
munity from seizure merely because it is located among protected
documents. The government remains free to subpoena seizable
documents, thus allowing the individual in possession, or his coun-
280 Id. at 322-23.
281 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 551.
282 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
283 Id. at 558.
28 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
285 Id. at 644-45.
288 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
287 Id. at 146-49.
28 An individual should not be able to invoke this rule to immunize a substantial number
of unprotected documents if he has scattered among them a few private papers. Cf. Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977) (cataloguing of presidential papers
containing a small proportion of personal papers).
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sel, to separate the documents from papers protected by the fourth
amendment. In Zurcher, the Supreme Court rejected a newspa-
per's contention that the fourth amendment requires law enforce-
ment officials in search of photographs as evidence against a third
party to use a subpoena instead of a search warrant to obtain the
photographs from the newspaper's files.2 89 Because officials pre-
sumably could identify the photographs they sought without read-
ing any documents, the Court's holding may be consistent with the
protection of private papers.290 Had the authorities been seeking
documents, however, they should have been required to use a nar-
rowly-drawn subpoena. 29 1
When the government believes that neither the individual in
possession of the seizable documents nor his counsel can be relied
on to separate those documents from protected papers, it may re-
quest a judge to review the materials in an in camera proceeding.
Although such proceedings are not common, they are sometimes
used to review materials that the prosecution asserts are privileged
from examination by the defendant. A private party should have
access to the same procedure against the government. If the gov-
ernment has reason to believe that documents are in danger of de-
struction it may seek a warrant directing that the documents be
seized unread, placed under seal, and brought to a judge for a
prompt in camera examination.
Subpoena and in camera procedures will ordinarily both further
the government's interest in obtaining a specific seizable document
and preserve the privacy of other papers the fourth amendment
protects. These procedures should be used only to identify and to
obtain documents that the government has specified with reasona-
ble particularity. Search warrants have sometimes authorized po-
lice to browse through an individual's papers, not in search of a
specific document or type of document, but to seize any document
299 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 560-63.
290 An unresolved factual dispute in Zurcher was whether the police had read any notes
or correspondence during the search. The Supreme Court indicated that any such action
would have "exceeded the limits of the warrant." Id. at 551 (footnote omitted).
291 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Zurcher, argued, "[i]f the Framers had
believed that the press was entitled to a special procedure, not available to others, when
government authorities required evidence in its possession, one would have expected the
terms of the Fourth Amendment to reflect that belief." Id. at 569. The terms of the amend-
ment do reflect a special concern for papers, see supra note 2, and the historical background
of the amendment indicates which papers were of particular concern to the framers.
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that might prove a particular crime. 9 These searches have often
found none of the evidence contemplated by the warrant, and have
instead uncovered items resulting in charges unrelated to the origi-
nal investigation.293 Neither a court in an in camera proceeding nor
an individual pursuant to a subpoena should be expected to con-
duct such a fishing expedition. If a court or an individual were
asked to turn over unrelated materials to the police, an in camera
proceeding or a subpoena focused on even the most specific docu-
ments could become an open-ended rummaging for any document
relating to any crime. The procedures would be as offensive to the
fourth amendment as search warrant of similar scope.
During the decades that the Supreme Court exempted private
papers from seizure, it distinguished between protected papers and
documents-such as forged checks-said to be "instrumentalities"
of crime.294 Whatever its theoretical and practical problems, this
distinction is not inconsistent with the prevailing eighteenth-cen-
tury concern for private papers. Courts and commentators two
centuries ago cited documents concerning an individual's personal
life295 or political and speech-related activities 2s6 as deserving of
secrecy. Business or financial documents were occasionally men-
tioned,9 7 but were clearly of far less concern. Ordinarily neither
business records nor documents that are instrumentalities of crime
292 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976) (warrant authorized the
seizure of all "fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown").
293 See supra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
"4 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S 338, 341 (1974) (loansharking record); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 147, 154 (1947) (altered draft cards); Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 583 (1946) (unlawfully possessed gasoline ration coupons); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (ledger "a part of the outfit or equipment actually used" to
violate the National Prohibition Act); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921)
("contracts... used as instruments ... for perpetrating frauds").
'Il See supra notes 78-80, 116-20, 188 and accompanying text. Personal letters are partic-
ularly likely to contain confidential information. As one commentator has noted:
The confiscation of personal letters involves a potentially serious invasion of pri-
vacy. People often reveal aspects of their lives to close friends, relatives, ministers,
doctors and others that they would not want revealed to anyone else. Letters sent to
an individual could involve discussions of such matters as easily as those sent by an
individual.
Comment, supra note 1, at 302-03.
I" See supra notes 160, 169 and accompanying text. For a modern example of sensitive
political or speech-related documents, see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (mem-
bership lists).
I" See supra notes 116, 188 and accompanying text.
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contain the personal or speech-related confidences that were the
historical focus of the fourth amendment's search and seizure
clause. 98
B. "Unreasonable" Self-Incrimination
For almost a century the Supreme Court referred to the problem
of compulsory self-incrimination in determining the reasonableness
of a particular search and seizure of papers.299 In Boyd v. United
States,300 the Court commented on "the intimate relation be-
tween" the fourth and fifth amendments,30 1 and noted that if a
seizure of private papers is at issue "the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other. ' 30 2 Within the last decade, how-
ever, the Court has attempted to distinguish strictly between the
two constitutional protections. In Fisher v. United States"3 and
Andresen v. Maryland,0 4 the Court suggested that in assessing a
challenge to the seizure or subpoena of incriminating documents
fourth and fifth amendment issues must be treated separately.30 5
The Court implied that the seizure of incriminating documents in
no way affects the validity of a search.
The Court's earlier approach was clearly more consistent with
the language and historical origins of the fourth amendment. Boyd
implicitly assumed that courts, in determining the reasonableness
of a search and seizure, can and should consider the degree to
which the seized documents would incriminate their owner with
his own words.3 6 Indeed, nothing in the language of the fourth
298 Justices Brennan and Marshall, the most consistent advocates of immunity for private
papers, nevertheless do not extend the principle to corporate or other nonpersonal business
records. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 424-27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 432-33 (Marshall, J., concurring); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
299 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 456-57 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1959);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1911); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630-35 (1886).
o0 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
301 Id. at 633. The fifth amendment declares, among other things, that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V.
302 116 U.S. at 630; see id. at 633, 634-35.
303 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
30 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
305 Id. at 471-73; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400-01, 408-09.
230 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622, 630-31.
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amendment forbids considering self-incrimination, or any other
factor, in an assessment of reasonableness.
All searches and seizures involve a serious invasion of privacy,
and are permitted by the fourth amendment only when the inter-
ests of society outweigh the various injuries to the privacy interest
of the individual. A court should thus not be required to ignore
injuries to constitutionally-protected interests in assessing the
overall reasonableness of a particular search. On the contrary, inju-
ries to these interests deserve special consideration. The Supreme
Court has consistently demanded that courts consider injuries to
speech-related interests in determining if the fourth amendment
forbids a search, whether or not the search also violates the first
amendment.307 The values protected by the fifth amendment are
no less relevant to a claim of unreasonableness than the values
protected by the first amendment. Government conduct that falls
short of actually violating the first or fifth amendments may never-
theless injure their protected interests. These injuries should be
considered if they occur in connection with, and thus compound,
the invasion of privacy inherent in a search and seizure.
Moreover, Boyd recognized that historically the possibility of
self-incrimination was a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of
a search and seizure. Referring to Lord Camden's opinion in En-
tick v. Carrington,308 the Court asked:
Can we doubt that when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States were penned and adopted,
the language of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true
doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing
the true criteria of the reasonable and "unreasonable" character of
such seizures?309
The self-incriminatory character of private papers was an impor-
tant theme in eighteenth-century arguments against seizures of pa-
pers, articulated in Entick and by Justice Pratt in Wilkes v.
Wood3 10 and by a number of pamphleteers 3 1 Each argued not
307 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (requiring "scrupulous exacti-
tude" in examining seizures that affect speech protected by the first amendment).
1*1 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). See supra notes 67-90 and accom-
panying text.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
310 Lofft 1, 3, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (C.P. 1763)"("Nothing can be more unjust in itself,
than that the proof of a man's guilt shall be extracted from his own bosom."). See supra
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only that the use of seized papers as evidence was improper, but
also that the seizure of incriminating documents was itself
unlawful.
Since Boyd, however, the facts of the search and seizure cases
coming before the Supreme Court have understandably dampened
the Court's enthusiasm for the principle that animated the framers
of the fourth amendment. A number of the first cases after Boyd
concerned the seizure of documents belonging to a corporation, not
to the individual asserting self-incrimination.12 Later cases in-
volved documents that, at least in the Court's view, were instru-
mentalities for committing the underlying offense.313 The most re-
cent decisions concerned tax and business records, 14 materials
bearing only a slight resemblance to the documents that eight-
eenth-century English courts and commentators sought to protect.
The particular concern of eighteenth-century commentators fo-
cused on papers, such as diaries, intended solely for the use and
perusal of the author. In that era, writing out one's ideas for purely
private analysis and reflection was seen as an essential part of the
thought process. Commentators regarded these writings as essen-
tially unspoken thoughts that had never left the bosom of the
thinker.31 5 Exposing to government scrutiny documents essential
to the private development of ideas would stultify normal intellec-
tual life and development. Justice Brennan articulated the same
concern when he argued that "[t]he ability to think private
thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to
preserve intimate memories would be curtailed" if an author
feared that his written thoughts would be used against him in a
criminal proceeding.31 0
notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., supra notes 123, 141, 167, 189 and accompanying text.
312 See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 483-84, 489 (1913); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 368-69, 376-78 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906); see also
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnership documents).
313 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
314 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (business records); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (tax records); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (tax
records). Most lower court decisions on the seizure of documents also do not involve per-
sonal papers. See Comment, supra note 1, at 293-94 n.112.
316 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
316 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Professor
Taylor has described the use of a diary in a criminal proceeding as coming "perilously close"
to a violation of the fifth amendment. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpreta-
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Some more recent Supreme Court decisions suggest, however,
that the execution of a search warrant does not constitute compul-
sory self-incrimination because the police take all the action: the
owner of the documents seized is not compelled to do anything.-17
The same, of course, might be said of an electronic device that
could read the mind of a defendant as he sat in the courtroom and
broadcast his thoughts to the jury. Ultimately, courts must ask
whether the government has invaded the inner sanctum of ideas
and emotions protected by the Constitution, not whether the inva-
sion was achieved by means other than actual physical
compulsion.3 18
The suggestion that seizures of papers do not involve compulsion
also ignores the realities of a search. If Nathan Carrington, acting
as a private citizen, had attempted to enter John Entick's home to
seize Entick's papers, Entick could have shot him as he crossed the
doorway.319 Moreover, Entick would have had an absolute right to
the return of any item Carrington seized.32 0 A search warrant, forc-
ing an individual to submit to what would otherwise be theft or
burglary, surely involves more compulsion than the milder forms of
tion 66-67 (1969).
317 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976). This doctrine was criticized
in McKenna, supra note 18, at 61-62.
... Similarly, to suggest that an individual waives his privilege against self-incrimination
when he "voluntarily" writes down his thoughts is to revive in an extreme form the discred-
ited notion that the government may require the waiver of a constitutional right as a condi-
tion of receiving a benefit. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
518 (1958) (states cannot deny veterans' tax exemption to those who refuse to take loyalty
oath). The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applies to conditions on the exercise of
fifth amendment rights. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-06 (1977); Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). If individuals have a constitutionally-protected right to
place their thoughts in a diary or some other equally personal document, and a similar con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding, the government should
not be able to condition the exercise of one of these rights on waiver of the other.
' Wilkes reportedly remarked to the messengers who came to his house to arrest him
and to seize his papers, "had you come at one or two in the morning, I should have shot the
first man who entered my house; and with this sword, which I know well how to use, I
should have spilt the last drop of your blood!" C. Trench, supra note 36, at 106 (1962).
320 Wilkes had attempted to exercise this right against Lord Halifax. See supra note 110
and accompanying text.
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pressure the Supreme Court has held to violate the fifth
amendment.3 21
C. Speech and the Seizure of Papers
The seizures of papers that generated the eighteenth-century
controversy were conducted to facilitate prosecutions for seditious
libel. Under the common law of that era, criticism of government
officials was under certain circumstances a criminal offense. 22 Al-
though courts were slowly limiting its scope, the law of seditious
libel retained enough vitality at the end of the eighteenth century
to lead to the adoption in the United States of the Sedition Act of
1798.323 Indeed, prosecutions for seditious libel continued in Eng-
land until the early nineteenth century.3 24
Wilkes and his supporters argued that the enforcement of libel
law was not important enough to justify the intrusion involved in a
seizure of papers.2 s Although the critics of seizures of papers did
not question that seditious libel could legitimately be made crimi-
nal, they recognized that the distinction between seditious libel
and legitimate political speech was elusive,3 26 and that the govern-
ment could abuse libel law to punish unpopular authors and
causes.32 7 Therefore, commentators of the era were not prepared to
give prosecutors the same array of methods, including searches and
seizures, available against less controversial and presumably more
important crimes.
Although seditious libel is no longer a crime in this country, the
law of civil libel continues to provide present and former govern-
ment officials with a weapon to silence or to punish their critics.
321 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 71-76 (1973) (architects threatened with
loss of state contracts for five years).
322 See supra note 35 and authorities cited therein.
323 See J. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (1952); J. Smith, Free-
dom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (1956).
324 A. Aspinall, Politics and the Press 1780-1850, at 384 (1949); H. Wickwar, The Struggle
for the Freedom of the Press 1819-1832 (1928).
325 See supra note 160 and accompanying text; A Letter From Candor, supra note 162, at
30-32. But see Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1074, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P.
1765) ("All civilized governments have punished calumny with severity; and with reason.").
326 See, e.g., Letter From Father of Candor, supra note 92, at 18 ("this misdemeanor is
only a breach of the peace by political construction").
327 See, e.g., id. at 14; see also id. at 32 ("prosecutions for libels generally arise from, and
are pursued with a spirit of party-revenge").
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The Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan"8
and its progeny have given the press substantial protection from
libel suits. Nevertheless, civil libel law in the United States today
is in a sense even more far reaching than eighteenth-century sedi-
tious libel law in England. In Wilkes' day only critics of the very
highest officials were prosecuted for seditious libel; observers could
criticize with impunity the vast majority of government employees.
Today, however, even the lowest public officials may attempt to
mulct in damages their critics.
Civil libel law today thus plays a role similar to the law of sedi-
tious libel two hundred years ago, and is accepted with similar am-
bivalence. The impact of eighteenth-century libel law, however,
was limited by the general unavailability in civil and criminal cases
of compulsory process to obtain documents. 29 Whatever rules con-
strain modern libel law after New York Times, neither that deci-
sion nor the framers of the Constitution suggested abandoning the
protections offered by the earlier restrictions on the production of
papers.
In Herbert v. Lando,330 the Supreme Court permitted a libel
plaintiff to probe the defendant journalists' opinions through the
discovery process, declining to infer from the first amendment a
right to refuse to answer questions. If a libel plaintiff sought to
discover documents, however, any court-compelled production
would be virtually indistinguishable from Lord Halifax's methods
two centuries ago. A fourth amendment prohibition against docu-
ment discovery by libel plaintiffs would undoubtedly make the
burden of proof imposed by New York Times more difficult to
overcome. Nevertheless, Wilkes and his supporters successfully op-
posed compulsory production of papers because of the resulting
obstacle, not in spite of it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the eighteenth-century controversy over seizures
of private papers reveals several distinct aspects of the fourth
amendment. First, government officials may not peruse personal
328 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3" See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1074, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P.
1765).
. 441 U.S. 153, 170, 177 (1979).
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papers in search of documents not protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Second, the fourth and fifth amendments protect an individ-
ual's personal thoughts and reflections even if put on paper. Third,
the government or a plaintiff cannot compel the production of doc-
uments from a defendant being prosecuted or sued for speech-re-
lated activities such as libel.
Few if any of the cases the Supreme Court has decided in the
last decade have squarely presented these issues. But the Court
has had increasing difficulty accounting for the opinions in Boyd
and its progeny. The Court, apparently unaware of the complex
history of the search and seizure clause, has instead developed its
own very specific theories of the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. These theories may be internally consistent and even analyt-
ically elegant, but they bear little relation to the events behind the
adoption of the amendment.
The words of the fourth amendment, Justice Frankfurter
argued,
are not just a literary composition. They are not to be read as they
might be read by a man who knows English but has no knowledge
of the history that gave rise to the words .... One cannot wrench
"unreasonable searches" from the text and context and historic
content of the Fourth Amendment .... Words must be read with
the gloss of the experience of those who framed them. Because the
experience of the framers of the Bill of Rights was so vivid, they
assumed ... that their words would receive the significance of the
experience to which they were addressed-a significance not to be
found in the dictionary.331
The Court in the last decade has come precariously close to a con-
struction of the fourth amendment that, with only a minor change
in the paperwork, would have permitted Lord Halifax and the
King's messengers to seize the papers of John Entick and John
Wilkes.33 2 Such an anomalous result, elevating the convenience of
contemporary prosecutors over the intent of those who wrote the
.31 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(invoking and detailing the English and colonial experiences that led to the adoption of the
fourth amendment); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603-07 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (same).
1- The Supreme Court has in fact openly rejected one of the primary rationales used in
Entick to condemn seizures of papers: that the seizure violates the suspect's property rights
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fourth amendment, would be particularly incongruous coming from
a Court ostensibly committed to the principles of strict
construction.
in the papers. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 301-04 (1967); supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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